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SUMMARY
Formal verification or formal methods represent a rising trend in approaches to correct
software construction, i.e. they help us answer the question of how to build software that
contains no errors, colloquially known as “bugs.” They achieve their goal by providing
means for stating theorems about the program under test, and for proving such theorems
by methods well-known in mathematics, specifically in mathematical logic. Of course,
formal methods are no silver bullet and come with their own set of limitations, the most
significant of which is extremely difficult scalability with software size. In spite of the
limitations, there have been important breakthroughs in their applications over the last 10–
15 years, e.g. Leroy’s CompCert [1] (verified C compiler) or Klein’s seL4 [2] (verified
implementation of the L4 microkernel).
However, how bug-free is verified software in reality? Formal methods make a bold
claim that there are indeed no bugs in verified software, or more formally, that the software
precisely implements its specification. Unfortunately, as an empirical study from 2017 by
Fonseca et al. [3] shows, it may be just too easy to introduce errors into the specification
itself, either in form of mistakes (“specification bugs”), or in form of unanticipated assump-
tions. This thesis aims to take a broader look at formally verified software and formal veri-
fication systems, and identify the most common problems in formal methods’ applications,
leading to bugs still being present in verified software. In particular, the main contribution
of this thesis is an overview of several software projects employing formal methods at their
core; an empirical study of “real-world” guarantees that the formal verification systems af-
ford them; and, consequently, showcases of different approaches to verified software, along
with their strengths and weaknesses.
We believe that understanding how formal methods succeed and fail (or rather, how
they can be misused) will be helpful in determining when they become an attractive and
worthwhile choice for more ordinary (as opposed to top mission-critical) software. Indeed,
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we hope that this thesis may serve as an introductory guide for new projects to the guar-
antees provided by formal verification; correctness guarantees much stronger than those
given by software testing. We hope that in long-term, entry barrier to formal verification
will become sufficiently low for formal methods to enter mainstream software develop-
ment, making developers more confident about their programs, and hopefully ridding our




Building correct software can be notoriously difficult for humans, and as complexity of the
system under construction grows, bugs seem to be inevitable. On the other hand, the cost
of incorrect (a.k.a. “buggy”) software can be incredibly high in some application domains:
the most obvious examples are applications where human lives are at stake, like military,
aviation, or healthcare.
Formal verification or formal methods represent a rising trend in approaches to correct
software construction, i.e. they help us answer the question of how to build software that
contains no errors, colloquially known as “bugs.” The idea behind formal verification is
best illuminated when contrasted with more traditional technique for software quality as-
surance: software testing. While software testing can assure us that the program under
test behaves correctly for certain inputs (test cases), it can fundamentally never give us the
same guarantee for all inputs; the only way to do it would be to exhaustively test all pos-
sible inputs, and even the simplest programs have infinite input spaces (short of memory
limitations). There is a beautiful analogy to such an approach in mathematics: software
testing amounts to stating a proposition (e.g. “All numbers are even.”) and then proceeding
to “prove” this proposition by giving examples for which the proposition holds (“2 is even.
10 is even. 42 is even.”). Of course, it is beyond obvious that the proposition may still
be false; it suffices to give a single counterexample. However, how do we find it? And
therein lies the problem with software testing: much like we may never think of odd num-
bers which reveal the proposition to be false, we may never think of exactly those inputs
which cause the program under test to malfunction.
Formal verification takes the other approach: rather than checking a collection of known-
good examples, we attempt to prove that no counterexamples exist. Unfortunately, such
1
effort is almost invariably (much) more difficult than simple testing. At high level, there
are two ways to go about trying to prove such a claim: we may rest assured there are no
counterexamples either because we have checked all possible cases which might have been
a counterexample, or we gave a (hopefully correct) argument for why such a counterexam-
ple cannot exist. Observe that “checking all possible cases” may be regarded as easy from
a certain perspective: if there is only a finite number of cases to check, it could be done by
a machine with some description of all the possible cases and a trusted oracle that always
gives the right answer. On the other hand, giving a correct argument for non-existence of
the counterexample is much harder and cannot fundamentally be done by a computer alone;
this is the only way to go when the set of all possible cases is intractably or infinitely large.
1.1 Model checkers and automated verifiers
Model checkers and automated verifiers, such as L. Lamport’s TLA+ [4] or Z3 Theorem
Prover by Microsoft Research [5], respectively, are practical examples of the first, machine-
compatible solution. Both accept some sort of specification of what we are trying to prove
as input, and output the correct decision whether the proposition is true or not. Moreover,
both are able to produce a concrete counterexample in case the proposition does not hold.
This fact alone is regarded as highly useful during development: the developer is essentially
handed a test case for which their implementation fails.
Of course, both feature the same set of limitations we have described above: the set
of cases to check must be finite and as small as possible, so automated provers and model
checkers go to great lengths in an effort to finitize the testing domain and reduce its size as
much as possible. Reducing the number of test cases is often critical for practical applica-
tions, because it almost invariably grows exponentially fast with system complexity, easily
slipping into the region of non-tractable problems. The developer must be aware of this
fact, and sometimes simplifications must be made in the models or propositions to make
automated verification feasible.
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1.2 Interactive theorem provers
On the other hand, interactive theorem provers (ITPs) such as Coq [6, 7] or Isabelle/HOL
[8], represent the non-automatable approach. Correctness of ITPs is provided by deduction
systems built on sound logic, which prevent inference of false propositions. As suggested
by the name, interactive theorem provers require human interaction in order to obtain
proofs; they are capable of providing the developer with tools necessary for proof con-
struction and checking the proof for correctness. Sometimes they feature automated proof
strategies that are able to automatically prove statements of small to medium complexity;
however, the most complicated proofs are typically left to humans.
The most critical limitation of ITPs is severe lack of scalability: compared with writing
code, more human effort is necessary to get a correct proof, and while machines can help a
bit along the way, bulk of the complicated work is usually left to the user.
1.3 About this thesis
The rest of this thesis is divided in the following manner:
• Chapter 2. Chapter 2 introduces notation and basic concepts used in formal verifica-
tion, such as deductive systems, predicate and first-order logic, etc. The second half
of the chapter discusses type theory, which is the foundational basis for many inter-
active theorem provers used today. We omit more in-depth discussion of the theory
behind model checkers and automated verifiers, since they often rely on application
domain-specific techniques which are out of the scope of this thesis.
• Chapter 3. Chapter 3 surveys almost twenty software projects that rely on formal
verification in practice. We focus on systems software, and give a brief outline of the
formal methods’ role in each specific application. We give more detailed presentation
of four formally verified file system implementations, which are selected for fuzzing
experiments in the following chapter.
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• Chapter 4. Chapter 4 presents our fuzzing experiments in terms of the testing setup
and results. We introduce our novel FUSE test harness which builds on previous
work of Kim et al [9] on file system fuzzing and is designed specifically for tests of
FUSE-based file systems. In the second part of the chapter, results of the fuzzing
experiments are described, plotted and discussed.
• Chapter 5. Chapter 5 summarizes the efforts, contributions and results of this thesis,
and suggests a possible direction for future work.
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CHAPTER 2
BASIC CONCEPTS IN FORMAL METHODS
In Chapter 2, we introduce the theoretical basis for formal methods and program veri-
fication. We briefly describe deductive systems, propositional and first-order logic, and
mention some extensions of the first-order logic that are interesting from the program ver-
ification perspective. The second part of Chapter 2 talks about type theory, a particularly
useful theory suitable for reasoning not only about programs, but as it turns out, about arbi-
trary logical propositions as well. As such, the theory of typed λ-calculus lies at the heart
of Coq, one of the most widely used interactive theorem provers in the world today.
2.1 Logic and proof theory
First, we shall focus on the foundations of program verification, which are constituted by
mathematical logic and deductive systems. This section is not meant to be exhaustive, but
rather serve as a refresher of the most relevant concepts from formal logic and proofs. Our
primary source for the content presented in this section is the work of M. Ben-Ari [10],
which the reader is advised to consult for a more in-depth discussion of the upcoming
topics.
2.1.1 Deductive systems, proof calculus
Before delving into different logics, let us first consider deductive systems. Deductive
systems put a formal frame around the intuitive notion that logical reasoning amounts to
starting with a collection of axioms that are assumed true, and then deriving consequences
of the axioms using inference rules. Therefore, we can say that axioms and inference rules
together form a deductive system.
In this work, we will rely exclusively on sequent calculus based deductive systems.
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Notationally, a sequent is
P1, P2, . . . , Pn ` Q1, Q2, . . . Qm,
where P1, P2, . . . , Pn correspond to assumptions and Q1, Q2, . . . , Qm correspond to con-
clusions. We will interpret the sequent as “if all assumptions hold, then at least one of the
conclusions holds.” Note that n = 0 is allowed; such sequents correspond to conclusions
which are unconditionally true (tautologies), such as
` A =⇒ A





















New sequents can be inferred from previous sequents using inference rules, for which
we shall use the following notation:
premise 1 premise 2 . . . premise N
conclusion
To use this rule to infer the conclusion, we must first infer premises 1 through N . Observe
that axioms can be represented intuitively by setting N = 0; the following rule permits to
infer P at all times:
` P
Now we can proceed to introduction of two kinds of deductive systems: Hilbert-style
systems and Gentzen-style systems.
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Hilbert-style systems
The characteristic aspect of a Hilbert-style deduction system is inclusion of only a singular
inference rule; the rule is typically the modus ponens (a.k.a. implication elimination) rule:
` P =⇒ Q ` P
` Q
,
where P,Q are arbitrary formulas. To make up for the lack of inference rules, Hilbert-
style deduction systems typically introduce a multitude of axiom schemes, which allow for
derivation of more complex formulas. Three well-known axiom schemes are
Axiom 1. ` A =⇒ (B =⇒ A),
Axiom 2. ` (A =⇒ (B =⇒ C)) =⇒ ((A =⇒ B) =⇒ (A =⇒ C)),
Axiom 3. ` (¬B =⇒ ¬A) =⇒ (A =⇒ B),
where A,B,C stand for arbitrary formulas. However, the choice of fundamental axiom
schemes is not unique; in particular, only a single axiom scheme is enough to yield a
deduction system just as strong:
Meredith’s axiom. ` ((((A =⇒ B) =⇒ (¬C =⇒ ¬D)) =⇒ C) =⇒ E)
=⇒ ((E =⇒ A) =⇒ (D =⇒ A)).
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Consider the following example, in which the formula A =⇒ A is derived in a Hilbert-
style deduction system featuring the Axioms 1–3 listed above above:
1. ` (A =⇒ ((A =⇒ A) =⇒ A))
=⇒ ((A =⇒ (A =⇒ A)) =⇒ (A =⇒ A)) (Axiom 2)
2. ` A =⇒ ((A =⇒ A) =⇒ A) (Axiom 1)
3. ` (A =⇒ (A =⇒ A)) =⇒ (A =⇒ A) (MP 1, 2)
4. ` A =⇒ (A =⇒ A) (Axiom 1)
5. ` A =⇒ A (MP 3, 4)
As the example shows, working with Hilbert-style deduction systems can be often quite
tedious and unintuitive.
Gentzen-style systems
Gentzen-style deduction systems take the opposite approach; such systems typically feature
only one axiom scheme, the complementary pair:
` Π, A,¬A
where A is an arbitrary formula, and Π is a collection of arbitrary formulas (a.k.a. context).
On the other hand, plenty of inference rules are typically available, e.g.
(1)
` Π1, A ` Π2,¬B
` Π1,Π2,¬(A =⇒ B)
(2)
` Π,¬A,B
` Π, A =⇒ B
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The formula A =⇒ (¬B =⇒ ¬(A =⇒ B)) is derived in the following example to
demonstrate a Gentzen-style deduction system:
1. ` A,¬A (Axiom)
2. ` ¬B,¬¬B (Axiom)
3. ` ¬A,¬¬B,¬(A =⇒ B) (Rule 1: 1, 2)
4. ` ¬A,¬B =⇒ ¬(A =⇒ B) (Rule 2: 3)
5. ` A =⇒ (¬B =⇒ ¬(A =⇒ B)) (Rule 2: 4)
2.1.2 Propositional logic
Propositional logic is the basic formalism which captures the concept of truth of a state-
ment. The set of all propositional formulas F can be defined recursively as follows:
1. Atoms. P ⊆ F , where P is an unbounded set of symbols called atomic propositions
or atoms.
2. Boolean operators. If P,Q ∈ F , then
• ¬P ∈ F ,
• P ∨Q ∈ F ,
• P ∧Q ∈ F ,
• P =⇒ Q ∈ F ,
• P ⇐⇒ Q ∈ F ,
• . . .
The list of Boolean operators is non-exhaustive, additional operators are sometimes
used.
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Since we wish to include arbitrary propositional formulas in our deduction systems, we
need to specify how the system interacts with the Boolean operators. One option is to take
advantage of the fact that any Boolean operator can be expressed using implication and
negation only, e.g.
P ∨Q ≡ ¬P =⇒ Q,
P ∧Q ≡ ¬(P =⇒ ¬Q).
This is a suitable approach for Hilbert-style deduction systems. In Gentzen-style systems,
we can introduce additional inference rules instead, e.g.
` Π1, P ` Π2, Q
` Π1,Π2, P ∧Q
` Π, P,Q
` Π, P ∨Q
Ultimately, we wish to investigate truthfulness of the propositions in question, so we
need to define semantics for the formulas. Let A ∈ F and let PA be the set of atoms
appearing in A. An interpretation for A is a function IA : PA → {T,F}, i.e. a function
which assign truth values T and F to all atoms in A. With IA we can define vI(A), the
truth value of A under IA, inductively as follows:
vI(p) = IA(p), p ∈ PA vI(A ∨B) =





F, vI(A) = T
T, vI(A) = F
vI(A ∧B) =

T, vI(A) = T and vI(B) = T
F, otherwise
Truth values of the rest of the Boolean operators can be intuitively defined in a similar
manner.
10
The notion of truth value under an interpretation allows us to define several interesting
properties of proposition formulas:
• Logical equivalence. Let A,B ∈ F . If vI(A) = vI(B) under an arbitrary interpre-
tation I, we say A is logically equivalent to B, denoted A ≡ B. Note that A ≡ B
if and only if vI(A ⇐⇒ B) = T under any interpretation I. Logical equivalence
forms the basis for substitution, i.e. if A ≡ B, we may replace any occurrence of A
with B (and vice versa) without affecting the truth value.
• Logical consequence. Let A,B ∈ F . We say B is a logical consequence of A,
denoted A |= B, if under all interpretations I such that vI(A) = T, vI(B) = T
holds. Note that A |= B if and only if vI(A =⇒ B) = T under any interpretation
I.
• Satisfiability. Let A ∈ F . We say A is satisfiable if and only if there exists an
interpretation I such that vI(A) = T. A is unsatisfiable if and only if it is not
satisfiable, i.e. vI(A) = F under any interpretation I.
• Validity. Let A ∈ F . We say A is valid (or a tautology) if and only if vI(A) = T
under an arbitrary interpretation I. A is falsifiable if and only if it is not valid, i.e.
there exists an interpretation I such that vI(A) = F.
Observe that A is valid if and only if ¬A is unsatisfiable, and A is satisfiable if and
only if ¬A is falsifiable.
2.1.3 First-order logic
In order to motivate first-order logic, observe that propositional logic is not enough to fully
describe statements like
4x− 3 > 2y + 8.
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Indeed, this statement is not absolutely true or false; its truthfulness depends on what ex-
actly is meant by variables x, y, operators +,−, ·, and the relational operator >.
First-order logic is a more-or-less straightforward extension of predicate logic to incor-
porate the notions of a domain D; functions, which map elements of D to other elements
of D; and predicates, which map elements of D to truth values T and F. Formally, we
recursively define the set of terms T :
1. Constants. A ⊆ T , where A is a countable set of constant symbols.
2. Variables. V ⊆ T , where V is a countable set of variable symbols.
3. Functions. If fn ∈ F and t1, t2, . . . , tn ∈ T , then fn(t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ T , where F
is a countable set of function symbols; n ∈ N is called arity of the function fn (or
equivalently, fn is an n-ary function).
With the set of terms T we are able to recursively define the set of formulas in first-order
logic F :
1. Atomic formula. If pn ∈ P and t1, t2, . . . , tn ∈ T , then pn(t1, t2, . . . , tn) ∈ F ,
whereP is a countable set of predicate symbols; n ∈ N is called arity of the predicate
pn (or equivalently, pn is an n-ary predicate).
2. Boolean operators. If A,B ∈ F , then
• ¬A ∈ F ,
• A ∨B ∈ F ,
• A ∧B ∈ F ,
• A =⇒ B ∈ F ,
• A ⇐⇒ B ∈ F ,
• . . .
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This definition is adopted from propositional logic without change.
3. Quantifiers. If x ∈ V and A ∈ F , then
• ∀x A ∈ F ,
• ∃x A ∈ F .
Note that at high level, there are two significant differences from propositional logic: first,
the notion of atoms was extended into atomic formulas with their own recursive set of
terms; and second, the concept of quantifiers was introduced.
As in the case of Boolean operators, we need to define how deductive systems interact
with the quantifiers if we hope to to use them to manipulate formulas in first-order logic.
Recall that any ∃ operator may be turned into a ∀ operator using the identity
∃x A(x) ≡ ¬∀x ¬A(x)
In Hilbert-style systems, two new axioms for manipulating ∀ formulas can be introduced:
Axiom 4. ` ∀x A(x) =⇒ A(a),
Axiom 5. ` ∀x (A =⇒ B(x)) =⇒ (A =⇒ ∀x B(x)),
in addition to second inference rule, known as generalization:
` A(a)
` ∀x A(x)
In Gentzen-style deduction systems, we can simply add inference rules such as
` Π1,∃x A(x), A(a)
` Π1, ∃x A(x)
` Π2, A(a)
` Π2,∀x A(x)
Note that in the second inference rule, a must not occur in any formula in Π2.
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The concepts familiar from propositional logic, such as interpretation, logical equiva-
lence and consequence, satisfiability and validity can be extended over to first-order logic
while maintaining their intuitive meanings; the definitions are largely technical and we
omit them from our work for brevity. Interested readers are advised to consult our primary
source [10].
2.1.4 Beyond first-order logic
Higher-order logic
It is possible to extend first-order logic further, similarly to extending the propositional
logic, to obtain higher-order logics1 [11]. Higher-order logic permits predicates which
take other predicates as parameters, or allows quantifiers to quantify over predicates or
functions. Note that in first-order logic, an n-ary predicate can be thought of as a subset
of Dn (the set of tuples with n elements from D); in higher-order logic, these sets become
powersets, i.e. sets of sets. While interesting from a theoretical perspective, many useful
algorithms that exist for first-order logic (e.g. a proof-checking algorithm) do not exist or
are inefficient for higher-order logics, which severely limits their practical applications.
Intuitionistic logic
Intuitionistic logic [12] is an interesting restriction of classical logic which follows the
notion of a constructive proof more closely. For example, the informal semantic meaning
of a formula A ∧ B is not that A is true and B is true, but rather that one is able to supply
a proof of A and a proof of B. In a similar spirit, the formula A =⇒ B is considered to
consist of a method of converting any proof of A into a proof of B.
This fairly simple restriction has far-reaching consequences; most importantly, some
tautologies which are taken for granted in classical logic, such as the law of excluded
middle (A ∨ ¬A), double-negation elimination (¬¬A ⇐⇒ A) or proof by contradiction
1Note that propositional logic is sometimes called the zeroth-order logic.
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((¬A =⇒ ⊥) =⇒ A), cannot be proved (and hence used) in intuitionistic logic. Note
that this position makes sense from a certain perspective, e.g. a proof by contradiction only
shows that assuming ¬A leads to a contradiction (as opposed to demonstrating A directly),
and is therefore an intrinsically non-constructive proof.
However, associating a concrete proof with every proved formula has certain attractive
advantages, too. In particular, the Coq interactive theorem prover is able to automatically
extract programs from proof terms written in intuitionistic logic. Automatic code extraction
from proofs is a very useful feature depended on by several software projects which use
Coq for formal verification (more details are given in Chapter 3).
2.1.5 Extensions of logic for computer programs
Hoare logic
In his seminal paper from 1969 [13], a mathematician C. A. R. Hoare introduced an ax-
iomatic basis for computer programming, colloquially referred to as Hoare logic. The novel
concept in Hoare logic are so-called Hoare triples, which are statements of the form
P {Q} R,
where P and R are assertions in the underlying logic, named pre-condition and post-
condition, respectively, and Q is a (fragment of) computer program. Proposed semantics
for a Hoare triple is: if the statement P holds immediately before executing Q, then R will
hold after Q runs to completion.
To manipulate Hoare triples in a deductive system, new inference rules or axioms must
be introduced; for brevity, we only consider Gentzen-style deductive systems. The most
trivial inference rules are named strengthening the pre-condition and weakening the post-
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condition, for obvious reasons:
` Π1, P {Q} R ` Π2, S =⇒ P
` Π1,Π2, S {Q} R
` Π1, P {Q} R ` Π2, R =⇒ S
` Π1,Π2, P {Q} S
Elementary programs can be assigned Hoare triples by axioms. For example, consider
the assignment axiom:
` Π, P ′ {x := E} P
where P ′ is obtained from P by substituting all occurrences of x in P with E.2
Hoare triples describing larger fragments of programs may be obtained via composition
using the so-called composition rule:
` Π1, P {Q1} R ` Π2, R {Q2} S
` Π1,Π2, P {Q1;Q2} S
where the ; operator inQ1;Q2 is the sequential composition operator for programs, familiar
from languages like C. Intuitively, execution of the program Q1;Q2 consists of execution
of Q1 immediately followed by execution of Q2.
The most involved inference rule given by Hoare is the rule of iteration, which allows
to infer pre- and post-condition of a while loop:
` Π, P ∧B {S} P
` Π, P {while B do S} ¬B ∧ P
P is the so-called loop invariant. When using the rule of iteration, we must first show that
the body of the loop S re-establishes the loop invariant P , given that both the invariant and
the loop conditionB hold. Then, the rule of iteration allows us to infer that if P holds before
entering the loop, P will also hold at the end of the loop in addition to the loop condition
being false. Note that the rule of iteration has a built-in assumption of termination: the rule
allows to infer ¬B, which is a contradiction for infinite loops. However, Hoare logic is still
2Note that E must not have any side-effects.
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sound: the triple P {Q} S asserts that S is established after Q runs to completion, which
never occurs with an infinite loop.
Separation logic
Separation logic, described by J. C. Reynolds in 2002 [14], allows reasoning about pro-
grams in presence of heaps, pointers, and dynamically allocated objects. The key innova-
tion lies in extending Hoare logic with assertions about heaps:
emp empty heap
t1 7→ t2 singleton heap
A ∗B separating conjunction
A −∗ B separating implication
where t1, t2 ∈ T (terms) and A,B ∈ F (formulas). The first assertion (empty heap) as-
serts that the heap is empty; the second assertion (singleton heap) says the heap contains
precisely one mapping, which maps an address t1 to contents t2; the third assertion (sepa-
rating conjunction) claims that the heap can be split into two disjoint parts in which A and
B hold, respectively; and finally, the fourth assertion (separating implication) means that if
the heap is extended with a disjoint heap in whichA holds, thenB will hold in the extended
heap. Naturally, the programming language that is being reasoned about must incorporate
elements for manipulating dynamic memory; Reynolds uses the following notation:
x := cons(E1, . . . , En) allocation
x := [E1] lookup
[E1] := E2 mutation
dispose(E1) deallocation
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where E1, . . . , En are program expressions. Moreover, semantics of the programs must
include notion of the heap, i.e. a mapping from addresses to values that may be mutated
throughout execution of the program.
The intuitive ideas behind separation logic can be illustrated using its inference rules.
The relationship between separating conjuction and separating implication is described by
the following two inference rules:
` Π, A ∗B =⇒ C
` Π, A =⇒ (B −∗ C)
` Π, A =⇒ (B −∗ C)
` Π, A ∗B =⇒ C
Empty heap and singleton heap assertions are best shown in the axioms of separation logic,
which define how these assertions interact with the corresponding program elements. For
(local, non-interfering) allocation, we have
` Π, emp {x := cons(E)} x 7→ E
where x is not free inE (the non-interference3 property). Similarly, the (local) deallocation
axiom is
` Π, ∃x E 7→ x {dispose(E)} emp
Finally, the (local) mutation axiom is defined as
` Π,∃x E1 7→ x {[E1] := E2} E 7→ E2
Last but definitely not least, note that all the inference rules above are local, i.e. no
other statements hold simultaneously. To lift the local inference rules into global rules, a
3This is not a fundamental restriction of separation logic; a more complex definition may be given which
allows x to freely occur in E. However, we give the uncomplicated definition for simplicity.
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frame rule is introduced:
` Π, P {Q} R
` Π, P ∗ S {Q} R ∗ S
where no variable occurring free in S (the frame) is modified by Q. Intuitively, the frame
rule asserts that we may introduce arbitrary additional constraints, provided they are com-
pletely irrelevant with respect to the program Q.
2.2 Type theory
At the turn of 20th century, B. Russell famously demonstrated that formalizations of the
naı̈ve set theory put forth by G. Cantor some years earlier lead to paradoxes. Probably the
most well-known paradoxical statement involves a set S containing all sets which are not
members of themselves:
S = {x | x 6∈ x}.
The paradox arises when one attempts to analyze truthfulness of the statement S ∈ S;
indeed, according to the law of excluded middle, either S ∈ S or S 6∈ S is true, but
assuming one immediately leads to a proof of the other, i.e. a contradiction.
Mathematicians and logicians attempted to address this paradox in different ways. One
line of work focused on refining axioms of the set theory so that this paradox can be
avoided, and eventually evolved into Zermelo-Fraenkel (ZF) and Zermelo-Fraenkel with
the Axiom of Choice (ZFC) set theory, by far the most mainstream set theory used today.
Russell himself, however, went down the other path, attempting to restrict the logical
language in which the paradox is stated. That is perhaps the more intuitive approach: the
statement x ∈ x feels “wrong,” since intuitively x can either be an object or a set of x-like
objects, but not both at the same time. The restriction of such statements led to development
of type theory.
Amazingly, type theory has many applications in programming languages. As we shall
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see in the following subsection, there is a structurally equivalent paradox of self-application
in untyped λ-calculus; however, this dual paradox may be regarded as only a tip of the ice-
berg. There is a deep and fundamental link between logic and programs, known as the
Curry-Howard correspondence or isomorphism, which states that types may be interpreted
as propositions, and (typed) programs then become proofs of the corresponding proposi-
tions. This surprising development is summarized in the rest of the chapter; a book by
R. Nederpelt and H. Geuvers [15] shall be our elementary source, to which the reader is
referred for details.
2.2.1 Untyped λ-calculus
λ-calculus is a formalism introduced by A. Church in 1936 [16] in an attempt to describe
what functions can be computed. Despite its power, basic λ-calculus is remarkably simple
and intuitive; the recursive set of λ-calculus terms, denoted Λ, can be defined as follows:
1. Variables. V ⊆ Λ, where V is a countable set of variable symbols.
2. Abstraction. If x ∈ V and A ∈ Λ, then λx. A ∈ Λ.
3. Application. If A,B ∈ Λ, then MN ∈ Λ.
Abstraction and application may be intuitively regarded as an (anonymous) function dec-
laration and function invocation. The following example demonstrates the idea behind
representing a computation using λ-calculus:
(λx. 3x− 5)7 → 3 · 7− 5
→ 16.
Note that integer arithmetic is not part of λ-calculus definition; however, it is possible to
find λ-calculus terms for operators +, · and integers 1, 2, . . .4 so that arithmetic with these
4Such terms are called Church numerals.
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terms behaves as expected.
Several straightforward properties of λ-calculus terms can de defined:
1. α-equivalence. Two λ-calculus terms are called α-equivalent if and only if they
are the same modulo renaming variables bound by abstractions. α-equivalence for-
malizes the intuitive notion that the two terms λx. x + 5 and λy. y + 5 should be
equivalent, since the particular name of the variable introduced by abstraction does
not “matter.”
2. β-reduction. The concept of β-reduction formally captures the notion of compu-
tation, hinted at in the example above. A single step of β-reduction eliminates one
abstraction and one application from the term, substituting the second term in the
application into the body of the abstraction wherever the abstraction variable occurs.
3. β-equivalence. Two terms M,N ∈ Λ are β-equivalent if there exist two series of
β-reductions (one for each term) which reduce M,N to the same term.
4. β-normal form. A λ-calculus term is in β-normal form if we cannot apply any β-
reduction steps. In the example above, 16 is considered to be in β-normal form; in a
certain sense, the β-normal form represents the “result” of the computation.
5. Normalization. A term M ∈ Λ is weakly normalizing if there exists a term N ∈ Λ
such that M and N and β-equivalent and N is in β-normal form. The term M is
strongly normalizing if there is no infinite series of β-reductions applicable to M .
Note that strong normalization implies weak normalization.
On the positive side, untyped λ-calculus is as computationally powerful as it can be; it
has been proven equivalent to Turing machines and other general models of computation
[17], despite its conceptual and notational simplicity. On the negative side, desirable prop-
erties such as guaranteed strong normalization are missing. This is not only a theoretical
restriction; in fact, there is a λ-calculus term Y ∈ Λ, called the fixed-point combinator,
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which constructs an infinitely β-reducible term for an arbitrary λ-calculus term:
Y ≡ λy. (λx. y(xx))(λx. y(xx))
Indeed, given an arbitrary term L ∈ Λ, β-reducing the term Y L produces a term which has
Y L as a subterm, thus guaranteeing infinite series of possible β-reductions:
Y L → (λx. L(xx))(λx. L(xx))
→ L((λx. L(xx))(λx. L(xx))) ← L(Y L)
Note that the fixed-point combinator Y relies on self-application xx, whose meaning is
unclear and unintuitive (similarly to x ∈ x in Russell’s paradox).
2.2.2 Simply-typed λ-calculus (λ→)
Four years later (in 1940), A. Church himself presented an extension of λ-calculus [18]
which incorporates some of B. Russell’s ideas about types, addressing the outlined short-
comings of pure λ-calculus.
The set of types T can be defined as follows:
1. Type variables. {σ, τ, . . .} ⊆ VT ⊆ T , where VT is a countable set of type variables.
2. Function types. If σ, τ ∈ T, then σ → τ ∈ T.
The typing judgements are typically written in terms of a context Γ, a term M ∈ Λ and
a type σ ∈ T. The assertion
Γ `M : σ
is interpreted as “assuming the typing judgements in Γ hold, the term M has the type σ.”
The two inference rules for abstraction and application in simply-typed λ-calculus λ→ are
Γ, x : σ `M : τ
Γ ` λx : σ. M : σ → τ
Γ `M : σ → τ Γ ` N : σ
Γ `MN : τ
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in addition to the trivial axiom
Γ ` x : σ
if x : σ ∈ Γ
Note that the context Γ only holds typing judgements of the form x : σ, x ∈ V , σ ∈ T.
There are three questions with regards to types that we might desire an answer for:
1. Well-typedness. Given a term M ∈ Λ, find context Γ and a type σ ∈ T such that
Γ `M : σ.
2. Type checking. Given a context Γ, a term M ∈ Λ and a type σ ∈ T, decide whether
Γ `M : σ.
3. Term finding. Given a context Γ and a type σ ∈ T, find a term M ∈ Λ such that
Γ `M : σ.
As it turns out, each of these problems is decidable in λ→, i.e. there exists an algorithm
which produces the correct answer. This stands in stark contrast with more powerful typed
λ-calculus systems that we describe in the following subsections; in those systems, at least
some of these problems are usually undecidable. Term finding is typically the culprit, since
under the Curry-Howard isomorphism, the term finding problem actually asks for a proof
of an arbitrary proposition.
Restricting the set of terms to typeable terms (i.e. only those which have a type) guaran-
tees useful properties of λ→: by uniqueness of types we have a unique type for each term,
which can be shown to rule out self-application and the fixed-point combinator; strong
normalization guarantees that every term has a (unique) β-normal form without the risk of
infinite chain of β-reductions. These properties come at a high price, though, because λ→
lacks significant portion of the computational expressivity of untyped λ-calculus. In fact,
it is possible to define Church numerals, addition and multiplication, but not much else.
Therefore, the following systems will attempt to recover some of the computational power
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by using more sophisticated type systems.
2.2.3 System F
System F, a.k.a. the second-order λ-calculus λ2, was introduced by J.-Y. Girard in his dis-
sertation from 1972; his own account of System F and its impact on the subsequent research
can be found in a paper published in 1986 [19]. Although Girard’s reasons for studying Sys-
tem F were more theoretical, it is possible to motivate the extensions introduced in System
F by the following question: what should be the type of the identity function? By identity
function, we mean the λ-calculus term λx. x.
In λ→, the identity function can be typed as ` λx : σ. x : σ → σ. However, note that
the type variable σ is in fact part of the term itself: λx : σ. x literally includes the type
variable σ. In practice, this means we have a separate identity function for each type:
` λx : nat. x : nat→ nat
` λx : bool. x : bool→ bool
` λx : nat→ bool. x : (nat→ bool)→ (nat→ bool)
What we might seek instead is a polymorphic identity function, i.e. a single function which
works for all possible types. In System F, such a function can be defined by the term
λα : ∗. λx : α. x
Note that the syntax includes another abstraction, but on the type level: the abstraction
introduces a new type variable α, whose “type” is ∗. This observation hints at a different
perspective when classifying the typed λ-calculus systems: in λ→, both the abstracted
variable and the body of the abstraction could only terms, i.e. the abstraction was a term
depending on term. In System F, we can also have term abstractions which introduce a type
variable, i.e. System F permits terms depending on types.
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Immediately, we need to answer another question: what is the type of such a polymor-
phic function? As it turns out, the type variable α must be introduced into the type as well,
using a new construct called the Π-type:
` λα : ∗. λx : α. x : (Πα : ∗. α→ α)
These two extensions combined are enough to provide the kind of polymorphism we set
out to achieve with our identity function example.
To define the set of types T used in System F, we will extend the definition of T from
λ→ (given in Subsection 2.2.2) with a third item:
3. Π-types. If α ∈ VT and A ∈ T, then Πα : ∗. A ∈ T.
Similarly, we extend the λ→’s definition of set of terms Λ with two new items:
4. Second order (type) abstraction. If α ∈ VT and M ∈ Λ, then λα : ∗. M ∈ Λ.
5. Second order (type) application. If A ∈ T and M ∈ Λ, then MA ∈ Λ.
In the deduction system for typing, the two most important additions are the inference
rules which define how to deal with types of terms involving second order abstraction and
application:
Γ, α : ∗ `M : A
Γ ` λα : ∗. M : (Πα : ∗. A)
Γ `M : (Πα : ∗. A) Γ ` B : ∗
Γ `MB : A [α := B]
where A [α := B] denotes the type A in which all occurrences of the type variable α have
been replaced by the type B.
In terms of properties, all proofs about the “nice” behavior of λ→ terms (e.g. strong
normalization) can be extended to System F; unfortunately, some of the algorithmic typ-
ing problems become more difficult. For example, System F permits self-application, as
evidenced by the typeable System F term λx : (Πα : ∗. α→ α)x(σ → σ)(xσ). On the
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other hand, the fixed-point combinator-like term (λx. xx)(λx. xx) is not typeable, but that
is far from obvious. A well-typedness algorithm would be able to provide answers to such
questions, but in 1994 J. B. Wells proved that both well-typedness and type checking are
undecidable in System F [20]. That being said, certain restrictions of the notion of poly-
morphism not only allow both problems to remain decidable, but even efficiently solvable
[21].
2.2.4 System Fω
System F introduces polymorphic terms, i.e. terms whose type involves a fresh type vari-
able. Analogically, we might want to construct types which include a fresh type variable,
that is, types depending on types; that is what System Fω, an extension of System F also
introduced by J.-Y. Girard, achieves. For a concrete motivational example, consider a func-
tion computing length of a polymorphic list: the function takes a list of values of type α
and returns a natural number:
λα : ∗. λx : list α. (. . .) : Πα : ∗. list α→ nat
Note that the list is polymorphic: a list of α-typed values has the type list α. This raises
an important question: what is the “type” of list? We may observe that list takes a single
type α : ∗ as a parameter, and is in itself a type, i.e. list α : ∗, which invariably leads us to
conclude that the “type” of list must be
list : ∗ → ∗,
which is the “type” of a type constructor: given a type, the type constructor returns another
type. Note that we put the word “type” in quotation marks; indeed, calling terms like
∗, ∗ → ∗, (∗ → ∗)→ ∗, (∗ → ∗)→ (∗ → ∗), . . .
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“types” is imprecise at best. We adopt the name kinds instead, in order to differentiate
between such terms and proper types. We also define the type of all kinds to be , i.e. for
any kind κ, κ : . Finally, a sort is defined to mean either ∗ or .
To formalize the extensions outlined above, first we need recursively define the set of
kinds K:
1. Atomic type. ∗ ∈ K.
2. Type constructor. If A,B ∈ K, then A→ B ∈ K.
Next, the definition of the set of types T given in Subsection 2.2.3 is adjusted to account for
more than one kind:
3. Π-types. If α ∈ VT , A ∈ K and B ∈ T, then Πα : A. B ∈ T.
In the definition of the set of terms Λ, we need to change the second order abstraction in a
similar way:
4. Second order (type) abstraction. If α ∈ VT , A ∈ K and M ∈ Λ, then λα : A. M ∈
Λ.
The inference rules for abstraction and application are modified analogically:
Γ, x : A `M : B Γ ` Πx : A. B : s
Γ ` λx : A. M : (Πx : A. B)
Γ `M : (Πx : A. B) Γ ` N : A
Γ `MN : B [x := N ]
where s is a sort. Note that there are some technicalities to be taken care of; namely, we
identify
σ → τ ≡ Πx : σ. τ,
and there needs to be another premise in the abstraction rule. An interested reader is advised
to consult [15] for details.
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2.2.5 λP
System F and System Fω extend λ→ with terms depending on types and types depending
on types, respectively; λP introduces the last combination, i.e. types depending on terms,
also known as dependent types. As a quick motivation, consider V n : ∗ (with n : nat), the
type of vectors of length n:
(1, 2, 3), (−30, 21, 18), . . . : V 3
(42), (108), (−37), . . . : V 1
(1, 2, . . . , n− 1, n) : V n
In all of the examples above, the type constructor V has the type nat → ∗, i.e. given a
natural number, V constructs a type.
This extension can be achieved by yet again introducing the Π-types into the definition
of the set of all types T given in Subsection 2.2.3; however, this time the argument must be
a term:
3. Π-types. If x ∈ V , A ∈ T and B ∈ T, then Πx : A. B ∈ T.
On the other hand, the definition of the set of all terms Λ remains the same as in Subsection
2.2.2, and the abstraction and application inference rules are identical to what was presented
in Subsection 2.2.4.
An attractive property of λP is its ability to directly encode arbitrary propositions and
proofs in the types and terms, as the Curry-Howard isomorphism states:
1. Propositions. We may look at an arbitrary type P : ∗ as a proposition, which is
inhabited (i.e. there exists a term of type P ) if and only if P can be proved; moreover,
terms x : P encode the proof of P .
2. Sets. Similarly, we may see that sets can also be encoded as types, i.e. for a set S we
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have S : ∗, and all elements a ∈ S correspond to terms a : S. If S is an empty set,
the type S must be uninhabited.
3. Predicates. Given a set member a : S, a predicate Q will produce a proposition
Qa : ∗; it follows that Q may be typed as Q : S → ∗.
4. Implication. Given a proof of A : ∗ (that is, a term x : A), an implication f creates
a proof of B : ∗ (i.e. fx : B); clearly, f : A→ B.
5. Universal quantification. Consider the universal quantification ∀x ∈ S Q(x),
where Q is a predicate. Given any set member x : S, proof of universal quantifi-
cation R is able to give a proof of the proposition Qx : ∗, which necessarily means
that R : Πx : S. Qx.
For an example, consider the following proposition in first-order logic:
(∀x, y ∈ S Q(x, y)) =⇒ (∀u ∈ S Q(u, u))
Intuitively, the proposition holds because ifQ(x, y) is true for any x and y, then it definitely
holds when x and y happen to be identical. The proposition above may be encoded in λP
as the function type
(Πx : S. Πy : S. Qx y)→ (Πu : S. Quu) .
A proof of the said proposition would be constituted by a λP term which has this function
type. Since the proposition holds, the type is inhabited and we are indeed able to find such
term:
λz : (Πx : S. Πy : S. Qx y) . λu : S. z u u
Observe how the proof term fully encodes the proof: it simply passes the arbitrary element
u ∈ S to the proof of ∀x, y ∈ S Q(x, y), instantiating Q(u, u). Since u was arbitrary, we
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get ∀u ∈ S Q(u, u).
2.2.6 Calculus of Constructions
The three extensions introduced by System F, System Fω and λP, namely terms depend-
ing on types, types depending on types and types depending on terms, respectively, can
be combined into a single, “ultimate” typed λ-calculus system, named λC (a.k.a. Calcu-
lus of Constructions). Calculus of Constructions retains all the useful properties of λ→ like
uniqueness of types or strong normalization; even better, well-typedness and type-checking
are decidable, as proven by van Benthem Jutting in 1993 [22]. Term finding remains unde-
cidable, but that much is understandable; we do not expect a computer to be able to prove
an arbitrary proposition.
There are still ways to extend λC further. One could for example incorporate induc-
tive types and the induction proof principle; this extension is called Calculus of Inductive
Constructions. Another possibility of extending λC is taking the idea of types–kinds–sorts
one step further and introducing an infinite, cumulative hierarchy of universes, in which
i ⊆ i+1 for all i; such extension has been named the Extended Calculus of Construc-
tions. Perhaps most importantly, both of these ideas (and others, too) form the theoretical




In this chapter, we survey formally verified software from four broad categories: applica-
tion software, operating systems, distributed systems and file systems. The list is by no
means exhaustive; its purpose is to showcase different practical approaches to verification
of software taken by various authors or groups. To that end, brief description of the used
tools and achieved results is included with each project.
We choose four formally verified file systems for fuzzing experiments: FSCQ, Yxv6
/ Yggdrasil, Flashix and AtomFS. For this reason, extra space is dedicated to discussing
more in-depth technical aspects of each.
3.1 Application software
CompCert (2006–2009) is a proven-correct C compiler; its formally verified front-end was
introduced by S. Blazy et al [23], while the back-end was presented by X. Leroy [1]. Comp-
Cert parses a program written in a subset of the C language called Clight and gradually
compiles it down to PowerPC assembly, passing through eight (!) intermediate languages
in the process. Each language has precisely defined semantics, therefore by proving that the
translation between two consecutive languages preserves semantics of the program, end-
to-end (Clight to PPC) refinement proof can be obtained via composition. All CompCert
code and proofs are written in Coq.
CakeML (2014–2019) is a verified implementation of a substantial subset of Standard
ML, introduced by Kumar et al [24]; however, it is being continuously developed to this day
[25, 26]. CakeML has been used to develop several verified applications, such as Unix-like
tools grep, sort or cat, or a certificate checker for floating-point error bounds. Notably, the
CakeML compiler itself has been bootstrapped as well [27]. For proofs and verification,
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the CakeML project relies on an interactive theorem prover HOL4 (HOL stands for Higher
Order Logic).
Ironclad Apps (2014), presented by Hawblitzel et al [28], are four apps running atop
of OS, libraries and drivers, all verified end-to-end using Hoare logic. Hawblitzel et al
write both the specification and implementation in Dafny and compile it to a verifiable
assembly language called BoogieX86. The entire system can then be verified using the
Boogie verifier, which relies on an automated SMT solver (Z3). The proof covers the
actual assembly code that gets executed, and demonstrates indistinguishability from the
app’s high-level abstract state machine.
Vale (2017) is a language for expressing and verifying high-performance assembly
code, developed at Microsoft Research with contributors from several universities [29, 30].
Vale allows the developer write assembly code annotated annotated with types, pre-/post-
conditions and other features designed to help write correct code. The Vale tool parses
the assembly code as well as the annotations and lifts them into Dafny, another imperative
language targeting the .NET platform that is amenable to formal verification using SMT
solvers, namely Z3. All relevant proof obligations are automatically discharged by Z3 be-
fore extracting executable assembly code for the target architecture. Vale has been used for
developing verified cryptographic code, among other things.
CSPEC (2018) is a framework for formally verifying concurrent software, introduced
by Chajed from MIT CSAIL [31]. Chajed notes that the key challenge in verifying concur-
rent software is the number of interleaved executions the developer has to consider; CSPEC
framework reduces the number of variants by exploiting left- or right-commutativity of
certain operations with respect to competing concurrent operations. The paper evaluates
CSPEC by implementing CMAIL, a simple concurrent mail server. Similarly to Chajed’s
previous work on CIO-FSCQ [32], the development and proofs are done in Coq, and the
runnable Haskell code is obtained by Coq’s code extraction facilities.
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3.2 Operating Systems
seL4 (a.k.a. L4.verified; 2009) is a verified implementation of a microkernel from the
L4 family, developed by G. Klein et al [33, 2]. It constitutes one of the most successful
applications of formal methods to realistic software. The final proof covers refinement of
an abstract specification modeled in Isabelle/HOL by the compiled executable code. The
project is also noteworthy for its development workflow: the design of the microkernel
underwent several iterations in which the prototypes were written in Haskell; however, the
final design was eventually manually rewritten and verified in C.
CertiKOS (2011–2019) is a framework for building certified OS kernels, developed at
Yale [34, 35, 36, 37, 38]. CertiKOS was originally introduced in 2011, but its develop-
ment has not ceased since. Initially introduced as a certified hypervisor for cloud environ-
ments with guarantees about correctness and absence of information leakage, CertiKOS
has evolved into a case study of building a verified concurrent OS kernel with fine-grained
locking, achieved by using “certified abstraction layers.” These layers compose and enable
refinement proofs while restricting interactions between different modules.
Hyperkernel (2017) is a verified OS kernel developed by the UNSAT group at Uni-
versity of Washington [39, 40]. Hyperkernel is in some aspects reminiscent of Yggdrasil
[41] (described later), a verified file system also developed at University of Washington:
specifications are written in Python as state machines with abstract state, all operations
are required to be finite (i.e. all possible traces of an operation have finite and bounded
length), and the verification work is off-loaded to an SMT solver (Z3). Contrary to Yg-
gdrasil, however, the implementation of Hyperkernel is written in C, and verified against
the specification at LLVM IR level.
Komodo (2017) is a formally verified reference monitor for ARM TrustZone, developed
at Microsoft Research with contributors from Cornell University and Carnegie Mellon Uni-
versity [42]. Komodo implements features similar to those offered by Intel SGX, except it
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does so in software: a privileged software monitor written in verified assembly code runs
on the TrustZone platform and presents an API for managing secure user enclaves. An
advantage of Komodo (compared to Intel SGX) is that its implementation is not tied to any
firmware microcode or even hardware, enabling easier deployment of upgrades and secu-
rity fixes. Komodo is built using Vale (described earlier), which depends on Dafny and Z3
under the hood for the verification work.
NiStar (2018) is an experimental kernel by Sigurbjarnarson et al, developed using
Nickel, a framework tailored for verification of information flow [43]. The novel aspect
of Sigurbjarnarson’s work is the focus on flow of information between threads and pro-
cesses and, in particular, the non-interference property. Interestingly, Sigurbjarnarson uses
Coq to build and verify a non-interference metatheory to serve as a basis for Nickel; Nickel
itself, however, uses SMT reasoning and Z3 to prove (or disprove) the necessary properties
about concrete programs. NiStar builds on HiStar, a kernel introduced by Zeldovich et al
(Stanford University) at 2011 [44].
Serval (2019) is a framework for developing automated systems software verifiers [45],
authored by the UNSAT group from University of Washington. Serval includes many ideas
from their previous work (Yggdrasil [41], Hyperkernel [39], NiStar/Nickel [43]), but ex-
tends them into a more general setting. Specifically, Serval lets developers write specifica-
tions in Rosette (an extension of the Racket language suitable for verification) and provides
tools for lifting the implementation code into symbolic values (via symbolic evaluation),
both of which are passed to an SMT solver (Z3) for automated discharge of proof obliga-
tions. Serval has been used as an alternative formal verification system for CertiKOS and
Komodo, among others.
3.3 Distributed systems
Verdi (2015) is a framework for formal verification of distributed systems by J. R. Wilcox
et al from University of Washington [46]. Verdi provides formalizations of various network
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models with different fault modes; developers can choose which model is most suitable for
their application. Moreover, Verdi allows for development of a correctness proof under
an idealized error model first, then later effortlessly transfer that proof to a more realistic
fault model. Verdi is implemented in Coq; to obtain executable code, users of Verdi are
encouraged to extract an OCaml program from Coq and link it with a Verdi shim, which
implements Verdi’s network primitives. Verdi has been successfully used to develop a
verified implementation of the Raft consensus protocol.
IronFleet (2015) is a methodology for proving safety and liveness properties of dis-
tributed systems, developed at Microsoft Research and presented in 2015 by Hawblitzel
et al [47]. IronFleet’s novelty lies in unique combination of TLA-style state machine re-
finement and verification based on Hoare logic: TLA state machines are used to reason
about concurrency at the protocol level while ignoring complexities of the implementation,
then Hoare logic is used to verify the implementation while ignoring concurrency. In terms
of tooling, IronFleet depends on Dafny and Z3 for automated proof search; the final exe-
cutable is obtained by translating Dafny to C# and compiling using a .NET compiler. Haw-
blitzel demonstrates use of the IronFleet methodology on development of two non-trivial
distributed applications, a Paxos-based state machine replication library and lease-based
sharded key-value store.
Chapar (2016) is a framework for verification of causally-consistent distributed key-
value stores by Lesani et al from MIT [48]. Lesani describes a common abstract interface
for key-value stores, together with operational semantics for implementations of this inter-
face; a concrete implementation is said to be causally consistent if it refines the operational
semantics. In addition, a novel proof technique called well-reception is presented, which
is shown to be a sufficient condition for causal consistency and reduces the proof require-
ments to a small set of specific proof obligations for each implementation. The techniques
are demonstrated on several examples of practical key-value stores. Chapar is formalized




COGENT (2016) is a purely functional language developed by contributors from CSIRO
and UNSW, Australia [49]. The COGENT compiler is able to generate three artifacts from
COGENT source: C code with the same behavior, a formal specification of the behavior in
Isabelle/HOL, and a valid proof that the C code refines the formal specification. This may
not appear very useful at first sight, as the COGENT code may still contain bugs; however, a
developer may supply an even more abstract specification of the desired behavior, and prove
that it is refined by the COGENT-generated specification. By transitivity of refinement,
such construction proves correctness of the COGENT-generated C code. COGENT has
been used to implement and verify a number of file systems: BilbyFS, ext2fs, vfat and f2fs.
3.4.1 FSCQ
FSCQ and its derivatives (2015–2018) were developed at the Computer Science & Artificial
Intelligence Lab at Massachusetts Institute of Technology by H. Chen, T. Chajed, A. Ileri
and others [50, 51, 52, 32, 53].
Crash Hoare Logic
Crash Hoare Logic (CHL), introduced by H. Chen et al in 2015 [50, 51], is an extension of
Hoare logic for the purposes of proving crash-consistency in file systems.
When Hoare logic is used to describe semantics of file system operations, every opera-
tion is associated with two conditions: a pre-condition and a post-condition. Both describe
state of the file system; the former is a state predicate which holds prior to invoking the
operation, while the latter is a state predicate that holds after the operation completes. Note
that this directly corresponds to what the proof of correctness needs to show, namely that
the operation establishes the post-condition upon completion, assuming the pre-condition
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holds at the start of the operation.
However, this approach alone is not sufficient for reasoning about crashes and crash
consistency of the file system. A crash may occur at any point during execution of the
operation, even before the post-condition is established. Additionally, file systems need
recovery routines to roll back (or forward) into a consistent state; it is not immediately
obvious how recovery can be incorporated into pre- or post-conditions alone. To solve this
problem, Chen et al propose extending Hoare logic with crash-conditions, logical address
spaces, and recovery execution semantics. All three will be described in the following
paragraphs.
The crash-condition is another state predicate associated with an operation, just like
pre- and post-condition. If, during execution of the operation at hand, a crash occurs, the
crash-condition predicate describes the set of all possible states the file system may be in
right before the crash. The disk model of CHL specifies that after the system is restarted,
the disk will have non-deterministically picked one of these possible states. This can be
contrasted with a model where the disk maintains only a single state throughout the exe-
cution: albeit simpler, this model cannot capture asynchronous writes, and therefore forces
the disk to operate in a synchronous mode, which comes with a considerable performance
penalty in practice.
Another concept that CHL introduces is logical address spaces. Chen observes that
many concepts in file systems are examples of logical address spaces: the disk is an ad-
dress space from disk-block numbers to disk blocks, inode layer is an address space from
inode numbers to inode structures etc. He also notes that specifying the disk state pred-
icates directly, everywhere throughout the file system stack, is rather cumbersome and
error-prone. The concept of logical address spaces is illustrated by an example: the first
abstraction one typically wishes to build on top of a persistent disk is a persistent write-
ahead log with atomic transactions. At this level of abstraction, the disk may be safely
viewed is a simple map from block numbers to blocks even in presence of multiple in-
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flight writes; the log recovery routine guarantees that all committed transactions will be
(eventually) replayed. Therefore, we wish to avoid directly specifying the set of all possi-
ble disk states in pre-/post-/crash-conditions of the log operations. Instead, the conditions
specify the (synchronous-like) logical address space presented by the persistent log, and
a representation invariant: a disk state predicate that describes the set of all possible disk
states such that the log presents the given logical address space.
Finally, recovery execution semantics allows to “erase” the crash-condition from the
public interface of the file system. As described above, crash-condition of an operation
describes the set of all possible disk states during execution of the operation, right before
the crash. However, when a crash occurs, the recovery routine makes sure the file system
remains consistent on restart. In that sense, the operation combined with the recovery
routine has no crash-condition, and the post-condition describes the state of the file system
either after the operation completes successfully without crashing, or after the recovery
finishes successfully (with possibly many additional crashes during recovery).
Architecture
High-level overview of FSCQ is given in Figure 3.1. Both Crash Hoare Logic and FSCQ
are Coq code; Coq is the interactive theorem prover used for development of FSCQ. Coq
fulfills two important roles for FSCQ: first, it verifies all the proofs of correctness relating
pre-conditions, post-conditions and crash-conditions, and second, it extracts executable
Haskell code from the Coq definitions. The Haskell code is then compiled by GHC (Glas-
gow Haskell Compiler) and linked with Haskell FUSE driver and libraries to produce a
FUSE file system server implementing FSCQ. When the FUSE server runs, it registers
itself into the VFS (Virtual File System) layer in Linux kernel, and awaits upcalls from
the kernel. When a user wishes to perform a file system operation (such as renaming a
file), a system call (in this case, rename) is issued to the Linux kernel. The kernel redi-
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Figure 3.1: Overview of FSCQ, adapted from [51]. Grey boxes indicate hand-written code.







Figure 3.2: High-level architecture of FSCQ, originally presented in [51].
for correctly handling the system call, issuing disk reads, writes, and other operations as
necessary.
Figure 3.2 displays how FSCQ code is modularized. The core modules are Cache,
which provides buffer cache, and FscqLog, which implements a persistent log with atomic
transactions (as briefly described in the previous section). Modules Balloc and Inode
are the only direct users of the persistent log; the former is used for bitmap-based allo-
cation of blocks, while the latter implements the inode layer. The BNode module uses
both Balloc and Inode to provide a block-based file abstraction, i.e. files which are
a list of blocks. Both directories (module Dir) and the byte-based file abstraction (mod-
ule ByteFile) are implemented on top of the block-based files. Finally, the module
DirTree combines the directories and byte-based files into a coherent directory tree struc-
ture, and the module FS implements all required file system operations using transactions.
Deferred writes and metadata-prefix
A follow-up paper, also by H. Chen et al, was released later in 2017 [52], describing D-
FSCQ (Deferred-write FSCQ), a variant of FSCQ with verified implementation of common
performance-oriented features like deferred writes, group commit, direct writes for file data
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etc.
In order to improve performance, two optimizations are commonly implemented in
file systems: deferred/batched writes, and log-bypass writes. Deferring writes lets the file
system buffer pending writes in a volatile memory, which allows the writes to be sent to
the disk in larger batches, improving throughput. In case of a crash, however, all buffered
writes are lost and never recovered, because they never reached the persistent log. Log-
bypass writes are useful in cases where data blocks of an existing file are being updated:
instead of writing the data block into the log first, and then updating data block of the actual
file, the write is never logged, which often offers substantial speedups. The drawback is that
the writes may be reordered by the disk controller, and consequently appear out-of-order
with respect to each other and with respect to metadata updates.
To counteract these potentially destructive side-effects, two additional operations are
supported by file systems: fsync and fdatasync. fdatasync ensures that upon its
successful completion, all data block writes to a given file have been persisted to the disk.
fsync, in addition to providing the same guarantee, also guarantees persistence of all
metadata writes related to the same file. Unfortunately, proper use of these two operations
is far from intuitive. Consider a simple task of atomically rewriting a given file with new
content; an application needs to make sure that either the original file is left intact, or it
has been completely rewritten with new data. Correct solution to this problem involves
creating a temporary file with the new data, issuing fdatasync on the temporary file,
calling rename to replace the original file and issuing fsync on the containing directory.
This approach is not immediately obvious and therefore error-prone.
DFSCQ formalizes these concepts into the metadata-prefix specification: the seman-
tics of fdatasync is identical to what has been described above, but fsync provides
a stronger guarantee, namely that all metadata writes (to any file, not just the given one)
have reached persistent storage. Additionally, the file system is allowed to flush either data
block writes in any order, or metadata writes in order up to some point in time; this en-
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sures that while data block writes may be arbitrarily reordered, the metadata writes always
correspond to some prefix of operations performed on the file system since the last fsync.
The metadata-prefix specification is then projected into the corresponding pre-, post-,
and crash-conditions of the file system operations. Since the metadata effectively corre-
spond to a directory tree structure, the DFSCQ condition predicates describe a sequence of
trees since the last fsync. When a crash occurs, the file system may recover to an arbitrary
tree in this sequence; notably, it will never recover to a tree not included in this sequence,
because the metadata writes are never reordered. That being said, the same is not true of
log-bypass data writes; the DFSCQ predicates reflect this by rewriting the data block in all
trees in the sequence.
3.4.2 Yxv6 / Yggdrasil
Yggdrasil (2016) is a toolkit targeted at helping programmers write formally verified file
systems, introduced by Sigurbjarnarson et al at the University of Washington. [41] Sigur-
bjarnarson also demonstrates the use of Yggdrasil by implementing a verified file system
Yxv6, a spin-off of Xv6’s file system; Xv6 is a simple Unix-like teaching operating system.
Yggdrasil
The Yggdrasil toolkit views both specification of the file system and its implementation
as a persistent state machine. Concretely, let s denote an arbitrary state, x an external in-
put (e.g. data to write), b a crash schedule, and f an operation transition function, then
f(s,x, b) denotes the next state of the system after the operation associated with f . Addi-
tionally, Yggdrasil maintains the notion of a consistency or well-formedness state predicate,
I(s), which determines if s is a consistent state, and a state equivalence relation s1 ∼ s2,
allowing to declare equivalence between states of two related systems (state machines).
For conciseness, the last two concepts are contracted into definition of a consistent-state
equivalence relation s1 ∼I1,I2 s2: if s1, s2 are arbitrary states of two state machines, I1, I2
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consistency predicates on their respective state spaces, and ∼ an equivalence relation be-
tween their state spaces, then
s1 ∼I1,I2 s2
def.⇐⇒ I1(s1) ∧ I2(s2) ∧ s1 ∼ s2.
User of the Yggdrasil toolkit needs to build two state machines: one corresponding
to the specification, and one corresponding to the implementation. Both consist of three
components: representation of a state, definitions of the operations, and the consistency
invariant. Moreover, a state equivalence relation must be defined, relating equivalent states
of the two machines. The key difference between the two state machines is that the specifi-
cation is allowed to use abstract data types and abstract data structures; on the other hand,
the implementation should be fully executable.
Given the two state machines and the equivalence relation, Yggdrasil toolkit attempts
to prove several theorems about the state machines, with the ultimate goal of proving that
the implementation state machine is a crash-refinement of the specification state machine.
The theorems build on one another and are as follows:
1. Crash-free equivalence. Let f1, f2 be operation transition functions, one from ei-
ther machine, and I1, I2 their consistency predicates, then f1 and f2 are crash-free
equivalent if
∀s1, s2,x. s1 ∼I1,I2 s2 =⇒ f1(s1,x, true) ∼I1,I2 f2(s2,x, true),
where true denotes a crash schedule with no crashes. Intuitively, crash-free equiv-
alence means that if the two machines start in two arbitrary but equivalent states
and both perform the crash-free equivalent operation, they will again end up in two
equivalent states (assuming no crashes occur).
2. Recovery idempotence. Let r be a recovery transition function, i.e. a special tran-
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sition function which takes no external input. We say that the recovery function r is
idempotent if
∀s, b. r(s, true) = r(r(s, b), true).
Intuitively, the recovery function is idempotent if the machine recovers to the same
state no matter how many crashes occur during recovery.
3. Crash refinement with recovery. Let f1, f2 be operation transition functions, one
from either machine, I1, I2 their consistency predicates, and r a recovery transition
function, then f2 with r is a crash refinement of f1 if f2 is crash-free equivalent to f1,
r is idempotent and
∀s1, s2,x, b2. ∃b1. s1 ∼I1,I2 s2 =⇒ f1(s1,x, b1) ∼I1,I2 r(f2(s2,x, b2), true).
Intuitively, crash refinement with recovery says that every state produced by f2, after
recovery has successfully finished, must be equivalent to some state produced by f1,
no matter what crashes occur throughout.
4. No-op. A transition function f with a recovery function r is a no-op if r is idempotent
and
∀s1, s2,x, b. s1 ∼I1,I2 s2 =⇒ s1 ∼I1,I2 r(f(s2,x, b), true).
No-ops capture the notion that the state machine may be running operations in the
background (e.g. inode garbage collection) which do not affect the externally-exposed
state.
5. System crash refinement. Given two state machines F1, F2 and a recovery function
r from F2, F2 is a crash-refinement of F1 if every operation transition function in F2
with r is either a crash-refinement of the corresponding transition function in F1, or
a no-op.
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Yggdrasil is targeted at verifying Python code, so both state machines are Python
classes: state is represented by instance variables, and allowed operations, consistency
invariant and the equivalence relation are instance methods. To actually prove the theo-
rems, Yggdrasil relies on an SMT (satisfiability modulo theory) solver, namely Z3. In
order to build an SMT-compatible encoding of the transition functions, Yggdrasil performs
symbolic evaluation of the instance methods to recover expressions for updating the state.
This places some restrictions on what the transition function may do, the most important
of which is loop length and recursion depth. Yggdrasil unrolls loops and expands recursive
functions without bounding depth, so it will fail on non-finite code; the user of Yggdrasil
must make sure that e.g. all loops are properly bounded.
Once the transition functions are expressed in a form suitable for the solver, the theo-
rems above are proved by attempting to find a model which satisfies their negation, i.e. a
counterexample. An advantage of this approach is that if the theorem does not hold, the
counterexample, which can often guide the programmer towards the offending bug, is read-
ily available. Yggdrasil explicitly supports this approach by providing a counterexample
visualizer, which will produce a human-readable trace of the file system operations leading
up to the point where the theorem is violated.
Yggdrasil also supports transition function optimization via rewriting the abstract syn-
tax tree recovered by symbolic execution. User-supplied optimizers need not be proven
correct; Yggdrasil automatically re-verifies the optimized version to validate the optimiza-
tion. A simple disk flush optimizer is supplied with Yggdrasil: the optimizer greedily
removes every disk flush from the transition function unless the removal causes violation
the crash refinement theorems. After the verification-optimization process is finished, the
resulting Python code is compiled using Cython and linked with FUSE into native Python
modules.
Figure 3.3 visualizes the development flow of a file system built using Yggdrasil. The
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Figure 3.3: Diagram of Yggdrasil development flow, taken from [41].
The dashed region at the top marks components which a file system programmer must
supply: high-level specification of the file system, the implementation that is to be proved
to be a crash-refinement of the specification, and the necessary consistency invariants. The
rounded boxes are all parts of Yggdrasil, and the curved boxes at the bottom are outputs of
the Yggdrasil toolkit.
Yxv6
Yxv6 file system actually uses five Yggdrasil-verified layers stacked on top of each other,
as shown in Figure 3.4. The reasoning behind this step is both conceptual and practical:
properly modularizing the code supports human understanding and ease of maintainabil-
ity, while simultaneously making the associated verification problems tractable. Indeed,
Sigurbjarnarson notes that verifying the bulk of Yxv6’s implementation code against its
specification directly (with no intermediate layers) is an intractable problem even for to-
day’s state-of-the-art SMT solvers.
The shaded, rounded boxes in Figure 3.4 represent abstract specifications, whereas rect-























Figure 3.4: The stack of verified layers that make up Yxv6. This illustration was originally
presented in [41].
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block device implements the asynchronous disk abstraction, but this must be assumed as
an axiom. To implement the transactional disk abstraction, a write-ahead persistent log
with atomic transactions is built on top of the asynchronous disk abstraction. In a similar
manner, the virtual transactional disk abstraction (which differentiates between virtual and
physical disk addresses) is built using regular transaction disks, and the inodes layer ab-
straction is implemented using virtual transactional disks. Finally, the POSIX file system
specification is implemented in layer 5, relying on the inodes abstraction.
3.4.3 Flashix
Flashix (2012–2017) is a verified file system for flash memory, developed by G. Ernst et al
[54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59] at University of Augsburg. The formal framework used in Ernst’s
work is Abstract State Machines (ASMs), introduced in the 1990s by Gurevich [60] under
the name evolving algebras. An overview of the framework is given e.g. by Börger [61];
summary of the key concepts in ASMs (as related to Flashix) is given in the following
subsection. Flashix is built with KIV, an interactive theorem prover actively developed
at the University of Augsburg. KIV features integration into Eclipse, a well-known IDE
for Java-based platforms; the publicly available code for Flashix is in Scala, a functional
language targeting the Java Virtual Machine.
Abstract State Machines
Abstract state machines may be considered an extension of regular finite-state machines.
An abstract state machine M is a triplet
M = (x : St, Init, p)
where x : St stands for the vector of program variables (i.e. the state space ofM ), Init ⊆ St
is a set (or a predicate) characterizing the initial states, and p is the main program describ-
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ing the computational steps of M . Computation of an abstract state machine starts in one
of the states from Init and proceeds by executing the program p step by step; the interme-
diate states are recorded and form a run (also called an interval). The program structure is
not described here for brevity, but syntactically resembles a regular programming language
with constructs like assignment, sequential composition, iteration, or procedure call; per-
haps more interesting is the inclusion of a non-deterministic operator of choice, which may
be used to specify non-deterministic machines.
A data type like abstract machine M is an abstract state machine
M =
(






where each operation Opj, j ∈ J is a quadruplet
(
prej, inj, pj, outj
)
: the program pj gives
the computational steps for the operation, reading input from formal input parameters inj
and writing output to formal output parameters outj , provided the precondition prej holds.
Intuitively, a data type like abstract machine is equivalent to an abstract data type (e.g. a
dictionary or a priority queue): the machine state vector x captures the internal state of the
data structure, while operations Opj are provided to the user for manipulation with the data
structure.
To achieve modularity, machines may be composed using submachine composition:
given an abstract state machine X ,
X =
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is called a supermachine with a hole. In addition to the usual syntactical elements, the
programs of M(·) may also include operations OpXj ; the use of X when referring to the
submachine operations corresponds to the interface contract between M(·) and X .
At this point, the last major missing ingredient is the definition of machine refinement.
Ernst notes that a meaningful refinement relation should be reflexive and transitive; addi-
tionally, refinement should aim to preserve the externally visible behavior while hiding the
internal state, i.e. if C refines A, we would like to use A to reason about the expected
behavior of the system, even though the actual code might be provided by C. This idea is
called substitutivity and is the central goal of any refinement proof. Refinement of abstract
state machines is defined in terms of their runs: a data type like ASM C refines a data





inputs i and outputs o, there exists an equally-long run of A invoking the same operations{
OpAj
}
j∈j and observing identical inputs i and outputs o. The machine C is allowed to
diverge, but only if A also diverges.
However, working with traces directly when proving refinement may be a bit unwieldy.
Therefore, Ernst proceeds to define a special case of refinement when the two machines A
and C remain in lock-step all throughout the execution: the forward simulation of ASMs.
Concretely, machine C refines the machine A if there is a forward simulation condition
R(ax, cx) relating the states ax of A and the states cx during an arbitrary run; of course,
the criterion R must fulfill several common-sense criteria, which we omit for brevity.
Treatment of crashes
The basic idea behind extending the ASM machinery to include crashes is to allow a non-
deterministic transition into a “crashed” version of a regular state, which signifies that
the system has not finished transitioning to the regular state. The crash transition is then
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immediately followed by two other transitions: the first transition, described by a relation
Cr, moves the system from the crashed state into some regular state, which is seen as
realizing effects of the crash. The second transition is a recovery transition that presents an
opportunity for the system to put itself into a consistent state after crash.
Ernst presents this design in a more general setting of transitioning systems; the defini-
tion for ASMs contracts the non-deterministic crash transition and the crash-effect realiza-
tion transition into a single step. Concretely, a data type like abstract state machine with
crash behavior is an ASM
M =
(






where Cr : St×St is a relation that describes the possible transitions caused by a crash. Af-
ter a Cr-transition (i.e. a crash) a specially designated recovery operation Oprec, rec ∈ J
is implicitly invoked, allowing the state machine M to perform the appropriate recovery
steps. All the important theorems building on top of the definition of ASM (e.g. subma-
chine composition, machine refinement, forward simulation etc.) are then extended and
reproved in the crash-aware setting; since it is a largely technical undertaking, the reader is
advised to consult the original source [59] for details.
Implementation of Flashix
Building directly on top of submachine composition and submachine refinement theorems,
Flashix is composed from several layers of separately-verified implementations of well-
defined abstractions (Figure 3.5). We shall describe the top half of the layer stack, since
the bottom half is largely concerned with details of flash memory and not directly relevant
to our work.
1. POSIX. The most abstract specification Flashix is ultimately targeting is the POSIX
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Figure 3.5: Overview of Flashix architecture, taken from [59] with slight modifications.
White boxes are specifications, while shaded boxes represent implementations. Dashed
lines between a specification and an implementation indicate the implementation refines
the specification. The lollipop notation (familiar from UML) is used to denote that an
implementation is internally a consumer of another abstraction.
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a recursively defined file system tree, a file store mapping valid file identifiers to file
contents, and a registry of open file handles. A file handle (direct equivalent of a file
descriptor) consists of a file identifier, an offset within the file, and a mode restricting
permitted operations on the file. Operations of a POSIX-compliant file system are
realized by algebraic operations on the file system tree. Ernst formally proves several
common-sense invariants that define consistency of the POSIX model, such as the
root is a directory, or the file identifiers mapped in the store are precisely the union of
file identifiers in the tree and in the registry of open handles. Notably, Ernst observes
that even at this level of abstraction, atomicity alone is not sufficient to reason about
crash-safety: since POSIX explicitly allows opened files to be deleted from the file
system tree, the file system has to manage orphaned nodes, which in the case of a
crash necessitates a recovery routine.
2. Virtual File System (VFS). Virtual File System directly refines the POSIX specifica-
tion into a concrete implementation, relying on AFS (Abstract File System) abstrac-
tion to provide more basic primitives. The file system tree from POSIX is broken
down into two mappings from inode numbers to files and directories, respectively;
a directory is represented as a mapping from children’s names to their inodes, while
a file is realized as a mapping from natural numbers to pages (with unmapped natu-
rals representing the all-zero page, which is suitable for sparse files). Some proven
invariants include zero is never used as a valid inode number, no inode number is
mapped to both a file and a directory, etc.
3. Flash file system. Core of the flash file system coalesces the three kinds of objects
exposed by AFS (inodes, directory entries, file pages) into a unifying concept of a
“node” identified by a key. Additionally, an indirection is introduced when resolving
a key into the corresponding node: the key is first looked up in a RAM index to
find the address of the node, then the address is read from the transactional journal
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to obtain contents of the node. The indirection is necessary to facilitate garbage
collection: nodes may be relocated to a different address during garbage collection,
but this is an implementation detail of a flash-based persistence solution and must
not leak into upper layers.
4. Transactional journal. Purpose of the transactional journal is to provide atomic
multi-node writes to the underlying flash device even in presence of crashes. At this
level, (logical) blocks are represented as lists of nodes: address of a node is given
by a logical block number and a natural number, specifying position of the node
in the list. Moreover, every node is accompanied by a metadata header detailing
information about grouping of the node in the logical block.
5. Index implementation (B+ tree). The index provides an efficient mapping between
node keys and node addresses; implementation is based on the well-known B+ tree
data structure. However, as Ernsts notes, the application of B+ tree is complicated by
the fact that the tree is never completely loaded into RAM, and during normal opera-
tion the tree is continually changing, but the changes are not immediately propagated
to the underlying flash device (for performance reasons). The mappings are stored in
index blocks, which are distinct from blocks used by the transactional journal.
3.4.4 AtomFS
AtomFS (2019) is a verified concurrent in-memory file system introduced by Zou et al
[62] at Shanghai Jiao Tong University. Zou builds the concurrency proof using an original
framework named Concurrent Relational Logic with Helpers (CRL-H), which is based on
a novel combination of local rely-guarantee reasoning, relational specifications, and a so-
called helper mechanism. CRL-H and all AtomFS proofs are written in Coq. As opposed
to the previous file systems, AtomFS explicitly avoids considering crashes in its specifi-
cations. Instead, it focuses on another important aspect of file systems, namely atomicity
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and behavior under workloads with heavy concurrency. Note that parallelism has been a
significant omission in specifications of the file systems we have described so far.
Towards file system atomicity with helpers
In order to prove AtomFS safe with respect to concurrency, Zou et al choose to show that
the implementation of the file system is a contextual refinement of an atomic specifica-
tion. Contextual refinement is a relation between an implementation and a specification,
defined using observable event traces: if every observable event trace producible by the im-
plementation can also be somehow generated by invoking the corresponding specification,
the implementation contextually refines the specification. The specification that AtomFS
provably refines is an atomic specification, i.e. it assumes all statements of an operation
execute atomically. Prior work has shown that contextually refining an atomic specification
is in fact equivalent to linearizability, which is (intuitively) the notion that there exists an
order of the concurrent operations such that executing the operations sequentially in this
order would yield the same responses.
The most straightforward way to prove contextual refinement is to establish forward
simulation relations, which directly relate abstract states of the specification and concrete
states of the implementation; the goal is to show that the concrete implementation “simu-
lates” the abstract specification. In greater detail, the specification consists of an abstract
state (which represents the concrete state on a logical level) and abstract operations (which
describe, logically, how the abstract state is affected by the operations); the contextual re-
finement proof then demonstrates an abstraction relation, an invariant that holds over pairs
of abstract and concrete states.
Intuitively, a valid approach would be to investigate the concrete implementation of
every operation and find a specific place in the code where the concrete state transitions
from the initial state to a state where the effect of the operation has taken place. Such a
place or point in code is called linearization point of the operation, for obvious reasons;
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since the linearization point is located statically in the code and does not move, it is also
sometimes called a fixed linearization point.
Unfortunately, Zou et al give a counterexample which clearly demonstrates that an
effort to find fixed linearization points in order to verify a file system with fine-grained
(i.e. per inode) locking is bound to be unsuccessful. Consider two racing operations,
rename and mkdir, where the mkdir operation is creating a directory in the sub-tree
which rename is renaming. It is possible that mkdir first descends into the sub-tree,
but while it is busy creating the directory, the rename operation renames the entire tree
and successfully finishes first, followed by the (also successful) mkdir operation. How-
ever, note that this is not a linearizable trace: during serial execution, the mkdir operation
would necessarily fail, since the sub-tree were moved elsewhere by the rename opera-
tion. Zou calls this occurrence the path inter-dependency phenomenon. In order to get the
correct trace, rename would have to “help” mkdir commit its effect first, causing the
linearization point of mkdir to reside outside of mkdir’s code. Such linearization points
are called external LPs. Luckily, rename is the only file system operation in the POSIX
specification which may break path integrity of other operations, and consequently leads to
external LPs.
“Helping” other threads is in itself a concept known primarily from lock-free and wait-
free algorithms. If an algorithm is to be wait-free, some sort of load-balancing mechanism
needs to be implemented so that less busy threads may take on work from overloaded
threads instead of idly waiting. However, Zou notes that the techniques cannot be directly
applied to file systems, because the concurrency in a file system is implicit rather than
explicit as in a parallel algorithm: the supporting global information such as thread iden-
tifiers or thread’s intended operations are missing. Additionally, the helping thread (a.k.a.
“helper”) may need to help an unbounded set of competing threads, and must consider the
order of the helped operations, since some orders may yield incorrect results. Finally, the
path inter-dependency can also be recursive: consider the case where one thread is renam-
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ing a subtree A, another thread is renaming a subtree B located within A, and yet another
thread is running stat on a file within B. When the first thread wants to help, it must help
the stat operation finish first lest an unlinearizable trace is obtained.
To solve the problems outlined above, Zou et al introduce a helper mechanism for file
systems, featuring ghost state and a linearize-before relation. Ghost state is a notion familiar
from other work in formal specification; it has no reflection in the concrete implementation
as it fulfills its role exclusively on the abstract side, facilitating the formal proof. In Zou’s
work, the ghost state supplies the context that is not explicitly given in file systems, namely
identifiers of other threads and their intended operations. The linearize-before relation, on
the other hand, is used by the helper to decide the helping set (i.e. which threads need to
be helped) and the helping order (i.e. in what order the threads in the helping set must be
helped). The ghost state and the linearize-before relation are combined in a single, abstract
operation named linothers: linothers uses the ghost state to detect other threads,
then uses the linearize-before relation to determine which to help and in what order, and
finally helps them.
Just to re-iterate, keep in mind that all of the concepts described above exist only in
proofs. The overarching goal is to prove that the concrete implementation contextually
refines an abstract specification that is atomic; helping other threads is simply an idea
about how to augment the abstract specification so that it can be refined by the concrete
code. Actual implementation of AtomFS does not “help” other threads in any way, and the
only synchronization is facilitated by per-inode locks and lock coupling (described later).
Concurrent Relational Logic with Helpers
In summary, Concurrent Relational Logic with Helpers (CRL-H) combines two pre-existing
approaches to verification, local rely-guarantee reasoning and relational specifications, and
extends them with the notion of helpers developed in the previous subsection.
Rely-guarantee reasoning uses rely- and guarantee-conditions (reminiscent of pre- and
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post-conditions from Hoare Logic) to reason about concurrency in programs. Rely-condition
describes how the state of the system may evolve on its own, without interaction with
the thread at hand, presumably due to interactions with other threads. On the flip side,
guarantee-condition constrains how the thread at hand may evolve the state of the system.
Both rely- and guarantee-conditions are typically defined as a predicate on pairs of current
and next system states. Local rely-guarantee reasoning introduces an invariant describing
the boundary between local and shared context, and a frame rule, which allows to strip the
unrelated context from the proof result and facilitates easier reuse of previously proven-
correct concurrent routines.
Relational specification has been described earlier: it is the idea that the specification
consists of abstract state and abstract operations, the implementation is made up of concrete
state (C memory) and concrete implementation (C code), and in order to prove contextual
refinement of the specification by the concrete implementation, we must establish an ab-
straction relation spelling out the precise relationship between abstract and shared states
and the corresponding operations.
CRL-H throws another two concepts into the mix: helper metadata and a roll-back
mechanism. Helper metadata is the ghost state introduced by CRL-H. Users of the CRL-
H framework may define what the metadata is precisely; the metadata should contain all
information necessary to determine the helping set and helping order, which may vary
depending on the use-case. The roll-back mechanism solves an interesting problem: when
a thread performs the (abstract) operation linothers, state of the abstract system may
in fact suddenly jump several steps ahead of the concrete state, breaking down the forward
simulation argument, i.e. the abstraction relation. The roll-back mechanism allows to
undo the extra operations on the abstract state, helping to re-establish the correspondence
between abstract and concrete states.
When the user of the CRL-H framework wishes to define a file system specification,
















Figure 3.6: Development flow with CRL-H. Rectangular boxes denote source code; shaded
boxed are components of the CRL-H framework; rounded boxes signify processes. The
curved box at bottom right is the final FUSE executable with file system implementation.
Note that the user-supplied C code is compiled directly without any intermediate transla-
tions; the Coq proof is about the C code. This diagram is taken from [62] (with minor
modifications), where it was originally presented.
conditions, and invariants specifying interactions among threads. To prove that a given
implementation contextually refines the specification, a forward simulation argument needs
to be made, so the user has to present a suitable abstraction relation. CRL-H supplies two
kinds of logic inference rules to facilitate this step: C-statement-rules, which allow the user
to reason about effects of C code and evolution of the concrete state; and implication-rules,
which allow the user to manipulate the abstract and ghost states in a manner suitable for
showing the abstraction relation. In this sense, linothers is simply just an implication-
rule where the user needs to supply a list of thread identifiers, and the state where all
specified threads have been helped becomes the next abstract state. A notable advantage
of CRL-H is its ability to analyze C code directly (see Figure 3.6), avoiding the need for
any translation between a high-level, semantic-rich language (e.g. Coq’s Gallina), and a
low-level implementation language (such as C).
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AtomFS
With all the theory developed in the previous subsections up until this point, AtomFS
becomes more or less a showcase of CRL-H’s abilities. AtomFS is an in-memory file
system without a notion of true persistence (all changes are lost when the file system is
unmounted), therefore its implementation is fairly simple. The proofs involving AtomFS
maintain eight separate invariants.
One of the more interesting aspects of AtomFS’s design is the non-bypassable crite-
rion. This criterion states that with two threads competing to traverse the same file system
path, an unhelped thread cannot pass a helped thread. The criterion, maintained as two sep-
arate invariants throughout the AtomFS’s proofs, guarantees certain unlinearizable traces
will not occur. Note that the criterion is stated in terms of helped threads, which is an
abstract notion; in the actual C implementation, the same behavior is achieved by lock cou-
pling, a technique where a thread will first acquire lock of the next inode in path before
releasing lock of the previous inode. This coupling prevents one thread “passing” another
one when traversing down the same path. Also note that this technique fails to work when
file descriptor based operations are considered: for this reason, AtomFS will traverse the




This chapter focuses on fuzzing experiments with four file systems of our choice: FSCQ,
Yxv6/Yggdrasil, Flashix and AtomFS. First, we describe our experimental setup in terms of
used software tools, and present a novel test harness designed specifically for testing FUSE-
based file systems. Challenges encountered during fuzzing of each of the file systems are
presented next, along with results of the experiments. Finally, we discuss related work.
4.1 Experimental setup
4.1.1 AFL
American Fuzzy Lop (abbrev. AFL) is a security-oriented fuzzer by M. Zalewski [63].
Among other things, AFL relies on genetic algorithms to automatically discover new test
cases, supports compile-time instrumentation (via a dedicated instrumenting LLVM IR
pass), and features a fork-server mode (including an IPC protocol) to speed fuzzing up
as much as possible. The last two features will be discussed next, as they are directly
related to some of the practical challenges we faced.
In order to drive the genetic algorithms guiding new test input generation, AFL collects
traces of test executions. Such traces allow AFL to determine e.g. if a given test input
triggers a new control flow path in the target executable, which makes the input more
valuable compared to other inputs. The traces are collected using a shared memory region
mapped by both AFL and the target executable into their respective address spaces, see
Figure 4.1. Prior to executing a test case, AFL wipes the shared memory to get rid of
any previous trace. Then, the (instrumented) target binary in executed: the instrumentation
code embedded in the binary maps the shared memory into address space of the test process
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2. AFL runs the target binary, passing
a reference to the shared memory region.
1. AFL clears the shared memory region.




3. Instrumentation in the target binary writes




Figure 4.1: Collection of a run trace with AFL.
(a reference to the shared memory region is passed via an environment variable) and writes
the trace into the shared memory. When the test process finishes, AFL simply reads the
trace from the shared memory region.
Therefore, the instrumentation has two goals: first, it needs to map the shared memory
region, and second, it needs to redirect the written trace to the mapped memory region.
AFL offers multiple instrumentation options to achieve these goals; in this work, we rely
on Clang- and LLVM-based instrumentation. AFL ships a wrapper around Clang named
afl-clang-fast, which uses an LLVM IR pass for instrumentation of all compiled
code at IR (intermediate representation) level, and links in supporting initialization code.
The initialization code maps the shared memory region before the function main executes,
employing a mechanism similar to how constructors of statically-allocated class objects are
run in C++. The LLVM IR pass inserts code at the beginning of each basic block to write
the trace to the mapped region via a global pointer variable.
The fork-server mode may be seen as an extension of the instrumentation. In addition
to mapping the shared memory region, the initialization code can also use predefined file
descriptors (by default, 198 and 199) to communicate with the parent AFL process and use
fork to spawn new test processes directly, see Figure 4.2. Without a fork-server, AFL
needs to call fork and execve to create a new test process every time, which is more
costly. Moreover, AFL allows to combine the fork-server mode with a so-called deferred
mode: in the deferred mode, the developer decides when the shared memory region is
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Figure 4.2: IPC protocol of AFL’s fork-server.
mapped and the fork-server started by calling a designated initialization function. Starting
the fork-server later in the main function gives the developer an opportunity to minimize
the performance penalty imposed by expensive initialization that does not depend on fuzzed
input; when the fork-server is started after the initialization is done, all children start out
already initialized. However, taking advantage of the deferred mode requires changes to
the source code of the target application.
4.1.2 Hydra / SymC3
Hydra (2019) is an extension of AFL introduced by S. Kim et al from Georgia Institute
of Technology [9]. The sole focus of Hydra is fuzzing file systems: Hydra’s test cases
consist of so-called syscall programs, sequences of file system-related kernel calls meant
to exercise the file system implementation. Hydra replaces all test input generation stages
with two stages of its own: one that randomly mutates an existing syscall program, and one
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Figure 4.3: Testing a FUSE-based file system with Hydra.
which appends a new, randomly selected syscall.
While Hydra appears to primarily aim at fuzzing in-kernel file system implementations,
it is also capable of fuzzing FUSE-based file systems; in fact, Kim et al report that Hydra
was able to find bugs in FSCQ, one of the verified file system using FUSE. A simplified
schema of a FUSE test case execution with Hydra is shown in Figure 4.3. After preparing
a clean disk image and writing out the syscall program (which constitutes the test case) to
a designated file, AFL starts the FUSE file system server to collect the execution trace. The
server loads the disk image and mounts it at a pre-specified location. A syscall program
executor, waiting in the background up until this point, detects the mount, reads the syscall
program (written out by AFL earlier) from the designated file and executes it at the mount
point. The desired AFL trace is collected during execution of the program. When the pro-
gram is finished, the syscall program executor invokes a checker to validate the results. The
checker can be an arbitrary program; Kim et al use SymC3, their own crash-consistency
verifier acting as a reference interpretation of the syscall programs. SymC3 constructs the
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expected content of the mount point after execution of the syscall program and compares it
to the actual content of the mount point: if they match, the mount point has been validated.1
A fundamental limitation of the FUSE test design in Hydra is that AFL never re-
ceives the feedback from the checker, since the syscall program executor (and therefore
the checker, too) is running alongside AFL. This is a missed opportunity: if AFL learned
that a given syscall program causes a validation failure, it might be able to generate more
interesting test cases.
4.1.3 FUSE test harness
One of the contributions of this thesis is a novel FUSE test harness, which represents a
fresh look at the problem of testing a FUSE file system server. We have considered the
following points to guide its design:
1. FUSE server inputs. The FUSE server under test has two inputs in general: a file
system image and a sequence of syscalls operating on the file system. Fuzzing the
file system image needs to be done in a file system-specific manner and requires
non-trivial effort on the user’s side. On the other hand, the syscalls have fairly well-
defined meaning and are common to all file systems. Therefore, our FUSE test har-
ness executes Hydra’s syscall programs to exercise the FUSE server; the disk image
is always a copy of an image supplied by the user. Note that the copy is unavoidable,
since the FUSE server will mutate the image.
2. Mount point validation. Hydra’s notion of external checkers makes sense: since
the validation is not part of the harness itself, such design supports loose coupling
of the components, permitting development of new checkers independently of the
harness. However, the limitation of the Hydra’s test design should be overcome; we
must be able to supply the checker’s feedback back to AFL. Therefore, the harness
1Note that this description deliberately glosses over some details, e.g. the FUSE server must be started
twice to avoid polluting the AFL trace when validating the mount point.
65
1. AFL writes out the syscall
program to a designated file.






4. The harness starts
the FUSE file
system server.
8. When the syscall program is finished,
the harness starts the checker.
FUSE test harness
7. The harness detects the
mount, loads the syscall
program and executes it






6. The FUSE file system server mounts
the disk image at the mount point.
5. The FUSE file system
server loads the disk image.
FUSE file system
server
9. The checker verifies content of the
mount point against the syscall program.
Checker
Figure 4.4: Testing a FUSE-based file system with the novel FUSE test harness.
necessarily has to communicate with AFL directly.
3. Harness overhead. Last but not least, any overhead imposed by the harness should
be as minimal as possible; time spent on anything else but fuzzing is wasted.
Based on the considerations outlined above, we have implemented a revamped FUSE
test design, displayed in Figure 4.4. Our design exhibits the following differences from the
design of Kim et al:
1. Communication with AFL. The harness is invoked by AFL and communicates with
AFL directly, which allows it to relay the checker feedback. The communication is
achieved by linking in the AFL instrumentation initialization code, as described in
Subsection 4.1.1. A fork-server is started after the harness is initialized; however,
none of the code in the harness in actually instrumented, so the shared memory region
for the AFL trace remains untouched. Note that the current implementation puts
some restrictions on the instrumentation in the FUSE file server, namely the fork-
server mode is not supported, and the instrumentation initialization code needs to be
called manually. However, these restrictions are merely implementation artifacts and
not technical limitations; both could be overcome with modest additional effort. We
leave lifting these restrictions for future work.
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2. Disk image copy. The harness, as opposed to AFL, assumes responsibility for
preparing the test disk image. The harness implements the image copy by file cloning
via ioctl(FICLONE), if the underlying file system supports it; this approach has
resulted in significant practical speedups on file systems which support Copy-on-
Write mechanism for data blocks (e.g. Btrfs).
3. Designated names. The harness does not use designated names for any of the in-
volved resources (i.e. the syscall program, the disk image or the mount point). Name
of the syscall program file is passed from AFL on the command-line; the harness
generates and manages unique temporary names for the disk image and the mount
point, passing them to the FUSE file system server and the checker via command-line
arguments as well. This design decision increases robustness of the harness.
4. Syscall program execution. The harness subsumes functionality of the syscall pro-
gram executor, i.e. the syscall program is executed by the harness itself.
A detailed sequence diagram laying out the flow of a single test using the harness is given
in Figure 4.5.
4.2 File system experiments
This thesis is focused exclusively on FUSE-based file systems. Reasons for this particular
choice are two-fold: first, majority of the verified file system we have surveyed are built
using FUSE, and second, some of the initial work has already been laid out by Kim et al.
Using our FUSE test harness reduces the developer’s effort necessary to start fuzzing
a new FUSE-based file system to the absolute minimum: all that is needed is building the
file system with AFL instrumentation and calling the instrumentation initialization function
before entering the main FUSE loop. Nevertheless, even just building with the instrumenta-
tion sometimes presents non-trivial challenges; we share our experience with instrumenting
the selected file systems in the following subsections.
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Figure 4.5: Flow of a FUSE server test.
68
We also run AFL with our FUSE test harness and SymC3 as a checker, and present the
results of fuzzing each file system in several figures. We give test execution time break-
down with respect to growing syscall program size in order to pinpoint bottlenecks hinder-
ing greater test execution speeds. We present a plot of coverage and test execution time
evolution over the duration of a single fuzzing session: such plot allows us to empirically
infer if and how early AFL manages to saturate the coverage map, and how complicated the
tests need to become to achieve such coverage. Finaly, we attempt to compare the FUSE
test executor of Kim et al with our test harness in terms of time spent executing various
stages of FSCQ tests.
4.2.1 FSCQ
Challenges
Since FSCQ has been successfully instrumented and fuzzed by Kim et al, we adopt their
approach. After Haskell code is extracted from FSCQ’s Coq source, it is compiled by GHC
(Glasgow Haskell Compiler). AFL does not provide tools to instrument Haskell code;
however, GHC supports LLVM as one of its code-generation back-ends. As a result, it is
possible (via suitable command-line options) to have GHC use the instrumenting LLVM IR
pass on the generated IR code, and link in the supporting initialization code. Moreover, the
instrumentation initialization routine can be called via Haskell FFI interface from the entry-
point function. In conclusion, a functional instrumented FSCQ binary can be obtained in
more or less straightforward manner with modest effort.
Results
Figure 4.6 breaks down the execution time of a single FSCQ test. Total execution time
grows with syscall program size, which is expected. For smaller programs, about 90–
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Figure 4.6: Absolute and relative execution time breakdown of FSCQ tests. The displayed
run is one of five runs with the median total execution time. The legend refers to completion



























Figure 4.7: Evolution of coverage and test execution time over the duration of fuzzing
FSCQ. Note that map coverage is unitless and does not relate to the time-labeled Y-axis.
execution, with the overhead imposed by FUSE server startup remaining minimal.2 That
being said, with growing program size there is a clear trend demonstrating domination of
the total execution time by the checker, SymC3: with 32 kB syscall program, it consumes
approximately 60% of the total execution time. We may conclude that optimizing SymC3
would be the best first step towards faster FSCQ tests with large syscall programs.
The progress of a single FSCQ fuzzing session is displayed in Figure 4.7. The map
coverage appears to become (almost) saturated after about 4 hours. Note that after running
for 14 hours, AFL decided to use more aggresive mutation, which resulted in the execution
time spiking over 4 seconds. No bugs were found during the 15-hour fuzzing session.
Figure 4.8 tries to quantify some of the performance differences between Hydra’s FUSE
test executor and our FUSE test harness. We refrain from comparing the two more directly,
2This is in fact an impressive achievement of GHC, considering that Haskell is a high-level language,



















Hydra's syscall program executor
Our FUSE test harness
Figure 4.8: Comparison of Hydra’s syscall program executor and our novel FUSE harness
in terms of single test execution time. The measurements were done on a test run with 4
kB syscall program.
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since they use a different test execution design (compare Figures 4.3 and 4.4). Neverthe-
less, we decided to at least compare the time spent executing the test stages present in
both designs. Our harness manages to slightly improve on the performance of Hydra’s test
executor by relying on more efficient APIs (e.g. we use fork and execve to start the
FUSE server and SymC3 processes, as opposed to system); most importantly, though,
our harness practically eliminates the overhead of copying the disk image. This is achieved
by cloning the file via ioctl (FICLONE), which performs a constant-time file copy op-
eration on file systems which support the copy-on-write mechanism, such as Btrfs. Kim et
al recommend running their executor on tmpfs, which does not support this mechanism; as
a result, copying the large disk images consumes a disproportionate amount of test execu-
tion time. This single optimization led to 2–5× faster test execution speeds, depending on
program size.
4.2.2 Yxv6 / Yggdrasil
Challenges
Yxv6 is written in Python and relies on Cython to translate its Python code into C. The gen-
erated C sources are then compiled with a regular C compiler into native dynamic libraries,
loadable as regular Python modules. Consequently, it is trivially possible to instrument
Yxv6’s code by using the C compiler wrapper provided by AFL, afl-clang-fast. Un-
fortunately, it is unclear how to link the instrumentation initialization code: it should not be
linked into every module, but linking it into only one of the modules results in unresolved
symbol errors in runtime. We were forced to rely on a workaround: we use LD PRELOAD
to force loading of the initialization code (linked into a dynamic library) before the Python
executable or any of the Yxv6’s modules. This workaround proved functional and enabled
us to successfully fuzz Yxv6. The instrumentation initialization routine can be easily called
via FFI provided by Cython.
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Results
Execution time breakdown of Yxv6 tests is plotted in Figure 4.9. We may immediately ob-
serve that Yxv6 suffers from severe performance problems under larger workloads: syscall
program execution time completely dominates all other stages for syscall programs bigger
than 8 kB, even executing the checker.
Looking at Figure 4.10, the map coverage for Yxv6 becomes saturated within the first
hour of fuzzing. We can see AFL going through several cycles before deciding to mutate
more aggressively at about 7 hours into the fuzzing session, causing the test case execution




Flashix is an example of a file system which turned out to be quite difficult to instrument.
To begin with, the Flashix FUSE server forks into background and does not exit when the
file system is unmounted. While the latter is probably a bug, both of these issues prevent
Flashix from being fuzzed with AFL. We were forced to manually investigate and debug
these problems; luckily, we found an undocumented option to force the FUSE server to
stay in foreground, solving both issues.
The public Flashix code is written in Scala, a functional language targeting the Java Vir-
tual Machine (JVM); as such, the Scala compiler produces JVM byte-code. AFL provides
no facilities for instrumenting Java byte-code; luckily, J. Judin has authored a toolkit named
java-afl [64] for performing the same task as afl-clang-fast, except with JVM byte-
code. The toolkit did not work out-of-the-box, possibly due to the fact that the byte-code
was generated by Scala compiler, e.g. it has incorrectly detected more than one entry-point






















FUSE server S2 ready
D2 prepared
File F1 copied to F2
Program P executed
FUSE server S1 ready



















FUSE server S2 ready
D2 prepared
File F1 copied to F2
Program P executed
FUSE server S1 ready
F1 and D1 prepared
Figure 4.9: Absolute and relative execution time breakdown of Yxv6 tests. The displayed
run is one of five runs with the median total execution time. The legend refers to completion

























Figure 4.10: Evolution of coverage and test execution time over the duration of fuzzing
Yxv6. Note that map coverage is unitless and does not relate to the time-labeled Y-axis.
$ truncate --size 256M disk-yxv6.img
$ mkdir -p mnt
$ python yav_xv6_main.py -o max_read=4096 \
> -o max_write=4096 -s mnt -- disk-yxv6.img &
$ cd mnt/
$ mkdir -p a/b c






3 directories, 0 files
Figure 4.11: Listing from a terminal session demonstrating steps to reproduce a bug en-
countered in Yxv6 implementation. POSIX file system specification states that the di-
rectory c should have been replaced by a/b; however, Yxv6 lists both directories when
enumerating contents of the file system root.
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Eventually, however, we were able to successfully instrument the Flashix byte-code.
We encountered two more problems when testing Flashix with our FUSE harness. First,
Flashix uses a hard-coded disk image file name, which required a simple adjustment to the
source code. Second, certain operations fail after mounting the Flashix file system, e.g.
appending data to a pre-existing file. Fortunately, we were able to discover a workaround: a
single write-only operation (like creating a file or updating the last modification timestamp)
on a freshly mounted file system corrects the problem. Therefore, our FUSE harness calls
utimes on the mount point prior to running the syscall program when fuzzing Flashix.
The last and most persistent issue with fuzzing Flashix turned out to be JVM perfor-
mance. In our experiments, the Java Virtual Machine took more than a second to start
executing Flashix code. As shown in Figure 4.5, the FUSE server is actually invoked twice
per one test case; altogether, a single Flashix test case required between 2.5–4 seconds to
execute. Naturally, such execution rate severely limits what AFL can do. We attempted to
improve performance of JVM in several ways:
1. Persistent JVM. Software called nailgun, developed by M. Lamb [65], allows to
start only a single instance of JVM and reuse it for subsequent executions of the
same Java byte-code. Unfortunately, it does not cooperate well with FUSE; in our
experiments, the JVM process consistently crashed the second time we tried to mount
a Flashix file system, printing a backtrace pointing to FUSE code.
2. Ahead-of-time compilation. JVM normally uses just-in-time compilation, translat-
ing the Java byte-code into native executable code in an on-demand fashion as the
application runs. However, there is an option to compile the byte-code ahead-of-time
with a separate compiler, avoiding the compilation penalty on JVM startup. We suc-
cessfully compiled the base Scala library ahead-of-time, but observed no measurable
speedup, and consequently abandoned this approach.
3. Fork-server mode. java-afl implements the AFL fork-server mode (see Subsection
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4.1.1) in an effort to avoid the JVM startup penalty. The implementation comes with
a warning, though: fork will only duplicate the calling thread, and since JVM uses
many worker threads, it will not behave correctly. Our experiments proved the fork-
server mode to be a non-option as well; the JVM simply got stuck and hanged as
soon as it tried to do any disk I/O.
In the end, we were unable to achieve a significant speedup of Flashix tests, and proceeded
to fuzz Flashix even with the extremely low execution rate.
Results
Figure 4.12 gives hard data to support our hypothesis that FUSE server startup is by far
the biggest bottleneck in Flashix test executions. A single JVM initialization takes over
a second, which, considering the FUSE server needs to be started twice, adds almost 2.5
seconds to every test case execution. The startup overhead is constant, though, so for larger
syscall programs its role starts to diminish. At that point, however, the total test execution
time is approaching 5 seconds.
Questions about effects of low execution rate on the fuzzing process are answered by
Figure 4.13. Note that Flashix is the only file system which we fuzzed in parallel with
three AFL instances (one master and two slaves). The immediately striking fact about the
plot is that the map coverage does not seem to be nearing saturation even after 60 hours of
continuous parallel fuzzing. This is certainly a limitation with regards to what bugs could
have been discovered; during the 60-hour long fuzzing session, we detected none. Note
that the spiking execution times around hour 15 and 62 are merely benign artifacts, caused
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Figure 4.12: Absolute and relative execution time breakdown of Flashix tests. The dis-
played run is one of five runs with the median total execution time. The legend refers to
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Test execution time (Slave 2)
Figure 4.13: Evolution of coverage and test execution time over the duration of fuzzing




AtomFS is implemented in C, so afl-clang-fast is able to instrument the source out-
of-the-box. Calling the instrumentation initialization function is similarly easy, the function
just needs to be declared with the correct signature.
As noted in Chapter 3, AtomFS is an in-memory file system and maintains no notion of
persistence, so it effectively ignores the disk image file (even though one is still required).
This proved to be a problem, since syscall programs need a non-empty file system; we
worked around this particular issue by having the FUSE test harness re-create the expected
file system content before executing the syscall program. Also, we could not remount the
file system before the checker is run, so we decided to run the checker on the testing mount
(D1 is Figure 4.5); the checker introduces some noise into the collected AFL trace, but that
was deemed acceptable.
Finally, note that the main contribution of AtomFS is verification of concurrency. Un-
fortunately, neither Hydra nor SymC3 provide any provisions for concurrent executions:
Hydra’s test case consists of only a single syscall program, and SymC3 cannot reason
about concurrent executions. Properly validating concurrent executions is a good subject
of future work.
Results
AtomFS is the only file system whose hand-written implementation is in C, and the plots in
Figure 4.14 definitely give a testament to that: the checker, SymC3, is the critical bottleneck
in AtomFS tests, consuming over 80 % of the total execution time. As noted in the previous
subsection, some stages (namely disk image copy and start of the second FUSE server
instance) do not apply in AtomFS tests, and are plotted as taking no time.






















FUSE server S2 ready
D2 prepared
File F1 copied to F2
Program P executed
FUSE server S1 ready



















FUSE server S2 ready
D2 prepared
File F1 copied to F2
Program P executed
FUSE server S1 ready
F1 and D1 prepared
Figure 4.14: Absolute and relative execution time breakdown of AtomFS tests. The dis-
played run is one of five runs with the median total execution time. The legend refers to



























Figure 4.15: Evolution of coverage and test execution time over the duration of fuzzing
AtomFS. Note that map coverage is unitless and does not relate to the time-labeled Y-axis.
83
map coverage becomes saturated within 60 minutes of starting the fuzzing process, and the
following “comb” formed by spiking execution times is an evidence to how AFL spins in




In this work, we introduced and briefly discussed some of the concepts and methods used in
formal reasoning and verification of computer programs; we surveyed nearly twenty soft-
ware projects (focusing predominantly on systems software) which use formal verification
for extended correctness guarantees, and outlined their high-level approach to applying for-
mal methods in practice; we selected four verified file systems (FSCQ, Yxv6 / Yggdrasil,
Flashix and AtomFS) for empirical validation of their correctness via software fuzzing; we
presented our experimental fuzzing setup, based on American Fuzzy Lop and prior work
of S. Kim et al on fuzzing file systems, introducing a novel test harness designed specifi-
cally for fuzzing FUSE-based file systems; and finally, we presented results of the fuzzing
sessions with each file system.
We discovered what we believe to be a bug in only one of the file systems, namely
Yxv6. While this result may seem encouraging from the perspective of formal verification,
software fuzzing as a technique suffers from the same flaw as plain software testing: we
may never be absolutely sure if our result is yet another certificate of the file systems’
correctness, or evidence of our fuzzing experiments’ limited abilities. In Chapter 4, we
specifically note that in at least two cases the experiments were unable to fully exercise the
file system under test: namely, the Flashix tests suffered from severe performance issues
due to prolonged startup time of the Java Virtual Machine, and the tests of AtomFS could
not verify its behavior under concurrent loads due to inherent limitations of Hydra and
SymC3. We suggest that a suitable direction for future work in this area might be extending
Hydra and SymC3 with the ability to generate and validate parallel file system test cases.
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